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Development Rights Transfer: 
An Exploratory Essay 
John J. Costonist 
Chicago's Old Stock Exchange Building, a 13-story architectural 
landmark of international stature, was demolished in 1972 to make 
way for a pedestrian 45-story off ice tower on one of the Chicago 
Loop's prime business locations. In Manhattan, the Tudor Parks, 
described by The New York Times as "two quiet green islands, sus­
pended above the compacted chaos of East 42nd Street in the pri­
vately-owned Tudor City development,"1 are targeted as the site 
of luxury high-rise buildings. P uerto Rico's Phosphorescent Bay, a 
unique ecological resource whose waters explode at dusk with the 
luminescence of billions of tiny dinoflagellates, is threatened with 
imminent degradation by industrial development on the still virgin 
lands that encircle the Bay. 
These and countless other imperiled resources seem to have little 
in common at first glance. Some are man-made, others nature's own. 
Their locations run from bustling downtown sites to once remote 
rain forests and nature preserves. They are cherished for purposes as 
diverse as landmark preservation, open space maintenance, and pro­
tection of the natural environment. 
Each is vulnerable, however, because it is a low density resource 
situated where the marketplace demands a high density use. This 
clash between resource protection and the development juggernaut 
defines the contours of a national land use dilemma. The recurring 
failure of conventional land use practice2 to accommodate these 
warring forces has resulted in demands for reform that, all too often, 
are nurtured more by apocalyptic rhetoric than by deliberate reflection. 
For most of this century constitutional jurisprudence exacerbated 
t Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. A.B. 1959, Harvard 
College; LL.B. 1965, Columbia University. 
I. N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1972, at 46, col. 4. 
2. Recognition of the inadequacy of existing techniques is  apparent in reports of 
influential land use study commissions; see, e.g., THE USE OF LAND, A CITIZEN'S POLICY 
GUIDE TO URBAN GROWTH (W. Reilly ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as USE OF LAND]; THE 
PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON URBAN HOUSING: A DECENT HOME, H.R. Doc. No. 34, 91st 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); and proposed legislative reforms illustrated by the American 
Law Institute's Model Land Development Code, see ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT 
CooE (Tent. Draft Nos. 2-5, 1970-73), and by national land use bills sponsored by the 
Nixon administration, see S. 924, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), and by Senator Henry 
Jackson, see S. 268, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). 
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the conflict. While few modern courts denied that resource protec­
tion was a legitimate governmental end, most scrutinized the eco­
nomic consequences of public programs adopted for this purpose. 
Measures that cut sharply into the p rofitability of p rivate property 
risked invalidation as uncompensated takings improperly implemented 
under the state's police power. Among the many rationales advanced 
to distinguish the valid exercise of the police power from uncom­
pensated takings,3 perhaps the most widely accepted is the harm/ 
benefit test, suggested by Professor Freund in 19044 and u pdatcd by 
Professor Dunham in 1958,5 which requires compensation if the regula­
tion creates a community benefit, but allows no recovery if it pre­
vents a harmful land use.6 
Programs that, without compensation, aim at resou rce protection 
by forbidding landowners to convert their land from lo\\·- to high­
density development are prime candidates for invalidation under the 
harm/benefit test.7 Worthy though the preservation of a landmark 
or nature preserve may be, this rationale insists that the community 
resort to its eminent domain power unless it can show that the pro­
posed higher density development will create harms that the com­
munity may proscribe under the police power. To do otherwise would 
compel the owner of the threatened resource to improve the com-
3. l'or a collection of legal writings exploring the distinction between the police 
power and the power of eminent domain, see Kusler, Ope11 Space Zo11i11g: Valid Regu· 
lation or Invalid Taking, 57 MINN. L. REV. l, 9 n.26 (19i2). 
4. See E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER 546-47 (1904). 
5. See Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Pla1111i11g, 58 C oLU:<r. L. RH. 
651, 663-69 (1958). 
6. [I]t may be said that the state takes property by eminent domain because it is 
useful to the public, and u nder the police po wer because it is harmful . . . .  
l'rom this results the difference between the power of eminent domain and the 
police power, that the former recognizes a right to compensation, while the latter 
qn principle does not. 
E. P'REUND, supra note 4, at 546-47. 
7. See, e.g., State ex rel. Marbro Corp. v. Ramsey, 28 Ill. App. 2d 252, l ii l'\.E.2d 
246 (1960) (mandating issuance of a demolition permit for the Garrick Theater, a Chicago 
Sc?ool of Arc
.
hitect�re landmark); State v. Johnson, 265 ..\.2d 71 l (Mc. J 9i0) (setting 
aside a permit <lemal and an injunction prohibiting the filling of appellants' land 
preparatory to sale); Aronson v. Town of Sharon, 346 Mass. 598, 195 N.E.2d 341 
(19�>4) (inva�id3:ting an al!lendment which zoned an area of the town as a rural single· 
residence d1stncl); Morns County Land Improvement Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills 
Twp . . 40 !'.'.·J·. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963) (invalidating zonino- intended LO prevent con­
stmct10n w�hm an ecologically sensitive marshland); Keyst';;ne Associates v. Moer<ller, 
19 . . Y.2d 18, 224 . N.E.2d 700, 278 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1966) (declaring invalid a statute wh1. ch created a pnvate corporation and vested it with power to condemn the :VIetro· poht31n Opera. �ou�e property and appropriate it for u se as a public auditorium, despite a prov1s1011 m the. slatut.e for compens3:ting the property owner s  who had in­tended to construct an office bmldmg on the site). But see McCarthy v. City of �Ian· 
hat�an Beach, �l. Cal. 2? �79, 264 P.2d 932 (1963) (refusing to invalidate a zoning ordmance perm1ttmg plamt1ffs' ocean-front property to be used only for recreational 
purp<;Jses). The Marbro court bluntly summed up the conflict: 
It 1s laudable to attempt to preserve a landmark; however, it becomes unconscion· 
able when an unwilling private party is required to bear the expense. 
State ex rel. Marbro Corp. v. Ramsey, supra at 256, 171 N.E.2d at 247. 
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munity's lot and would freeze his property in i�s current low density 
status while not similarly restraining the range of development op­
tions open to his neighbors. Moreover the "harm" prevented is a 
far cry from the nuisance-like analogue contemplated by Freund and 
Dunham. Rather, it is the termination of a community benefit­
fortuitously provided by the owner-to make possible subsequent 
development which, if undertaken by his neighbors, would not be 
objectionable on nuisance-related grounds. 
A community's options under the harm/benefit test have not been 
enviable. Because scarce public dollars ar.e typically earmarked for 
social needs more compelling than resource protection, eminent do­
main has usually not been feasible. Two alternatives remained: the 
police power and moral suasion. Wholesale attrition of America's 
natural and man-made amenities is poignant evidence of the in­
adequacy of these traditional options. 
Portraying the current land use climate or its likely evolution in­
vites confusion akin to that which befuddled Lewis Carroll's Alice 
in her maddening game of croquet. Some commentators speak of a 
"new mood in America";8 others of a "quiet revolution."0 However 
styled, ferment in the land use field is now so pervasive that, like 
Alice's flamingo, hedgehog, and card soldiers, nothing seems to stay 
put for very long, least of all the point at which judges will draw 
the line between the police power and the power of eminent domain. 
Indeed, some recent opinions appear to have all but def used the 
compensation requirement as an effective constitutional limitation on 
government's exercise of its land use powers.10 
8. See UsE OF LAND, supra note 2, at I 7. 
9. See F. BossELMAN &: D. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND UsE CoNTROL 
(Council on Environmental Quality 1971). 
10. See, e.g., Steel Hill Development, Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 
(!st C ir. 1972) (sustaining a six-acre minimum lot zoning restriction on a tract pur­
chased for recreational home development); Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San hancisco 
llay Conserv. &: Dev. Comm'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 55i, R9 Cal. Rptr. 8!)7 (1970) (sustaining 
denial of a fill permit for development along San hancisco Bay); Golden v. Planning 
Board, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (l!li2) (sustaining development 
regulations authorizing a municipality, i11ter alia, to prohibit subdivision development 
for up to 18 years}; Just v. Marinette County. 56 Wis. 2d i, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972) (sus· 
taining prohibition of residential development in state wetlands zone); cf. fo re Spring 
Valley Development, 300 A.2d 736 (Mc. I 9i3) (sustaining application of Maine Site Lo· 
cation of Development Law to .rnbdivided 92-acre private site); Poromac Sand &: Gravel 
Co. v. Governor of Maryland, 266 Md. 358, 293 A.2d 241, cert. de11ied, 409 U.S. 1040 
(19i2) (sustaining prohibition of dredging on private lands within state wetlands zone); 
Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 284 N.E.2d 891 (Mass. 19i2) (sustaining a 
virtual prohibition of residential development, citing combined flood plain zoning and 
ecological resource protection grounds). The wave of judicial decisions in the 19iO's 
sustaining environmentally-based land use regulation against the taking charge plays 
a prominent role in the remarkable proposition, recently adrnnced by three land use 
commentators, that the "regulation of the use of land, if reasonably related to a valid 
public purpose, can never constitute a taking." F. BoSSELMAN, D. CALLIES &: J. BANTA, 
T11E TAKING lssm: 238 (19i3} (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as TAKING]. 
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This turnabout is the result of five converging trends in the land 
use field. The most important trend is environmentalism, which pro­
vides the impetus for an expansion of government's land use po"·ers 
paralleled only by the United States Supreme Court's 192() decision 
in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Cornj1any11 upholding the constit11tionality 
of zoning under the police power. Environmentalists believe that all 
types of development threaten environmental quality. Thus, bifur­
cating development into harmful and nonharmfnl categories is, for 
them, untenable.12 Instead, the individ ual development decision, like 
Tennyson's flower in the crannied wall, should not be perceived 
piecemeal, but must be viewed in terms of its relationship to the 
larger context of which it is a part. This premise has become a staple 
a mong environmental economists13 and has made heacl,,·ay in the 
courts as well.14 Once development itself becomes suspect, little can 
be excluded from the category of harmful land uses. 
The benefit concept also experiences a trou hksome metamorpho­
sis. When resource protection was regarded as essentially a frill, a 
goal which the government could pursue only on a compensated 
basis, resort to eminent domain made sense. Recently upgraded in 
the literature and, increasingly, by the courts to a concern of utmost 
social priority, resource protection might now be attained under 
the harm/benefit test by means of the police pm,cer irrespective oE 
economic hardships suffered or windfalls reaped by individual land­
owners.15 
11. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
12. Seep. 100 infra. 
13. See P. BARKLEY & D. SECKLER, Eco:-.o:-.uc GROWTH AND EN\'!RO'\:\IE:-ITAL DECAY: 
THE SOLUTION BECOMES THE PROllLL\1 32 (19i2): 
The accumulation �£ people and their appurtenances in limited, technologically non­
expandable space 1s perhaps the ultimate resource constraint and the ultimate 
problem of pollution. 
See generally T. CROCKER & r\. RocF.Rs, E:-.vtRONMENTAL EcoNoM1cs (19il); .J. DALES, 
POLLUTION, PROPERTY, AND PRICES (1968); £. l\1JSHAN, THE COSTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 
(1967). 
14 .. For e�amplc? a federal court of appeals looked squarely to the environmentalist pre1�use for its rat10.nale in sust.aining .a six-acre minimum lot size requiremen t of a rustle New Hampshll'e commumty agamst the charge, i11ler alia, that it effected an 
uncompensated taking: 
We �-ecogniz� as within the general welfare, conc erns relating to the construction 
and mtegrat10n of hundreds of new homes which would ha\·e an irrevocable effect 
o':1 .. the area's ecological balance, destroy scenic values, decrease open space, sig· mllcantly change the rural �hara .cter of the small town, pose substantial financial burd�ns on the
. 
t�wn f�r. �ohc�, fire, sewer and road services, and open the way for the tides . of weekend visitors who would own second homes. If the federal gov­ernment. Itself ha� thought thes� concerns to be within the general welfare (citing the J'l'.at�on.al Env1�onmental Policy Act), we canno t say that [this community] can· not s1.nulaily consider such values and reflect the m in its zoning ordinance. Ste�l Hill Developme1!t, Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 .F.2d 956, 961 (1st Cir. 1972). b. Compare Mo1 ns County Land Improvem ent Co. v. Parsippany-Trny Hills Twp., �O N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963), wzth Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2<l 7, 201 N.W.2d 161 (1972). In Morns, Judge Hall, perhaps the most informed sitting jmist in land use 
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Heightened citizen expectations concerning the preservation of en­
vironmental amenities have come at a time of growing municipal 
impoverishment. Traditional methods of public finance have proven 
inadequate to generate the funds required to fulfill these expectations 
and to meet the expanded welfare responsibilities of government in 
the twentieth century. Sympathetic to the fiscal difficulties of local 
governments, the courts have increasingly chosen to acquiesce in a 
broadening· of the police power rather than force the scuttling of 
worthy public programs.16 
Third, courts have belatedly recognized that land development is 
a lmsiness. Seemingly obvious, this point has been obscured by the 
almost religious mystique that has set land development apart from 
other forms of business activity since the apotheosis of property 
ownership by Blackstone and other early English comrnentators.17 
Extolling the sacredness of private property, these apologists were 
not thinking of Boise Cascade, Zeckendorf, and Levitt but of the 
private citizen whose property was the principal barrier between 
himseH and the whims of an arbitrary state. In land-rich, laissez­
faire America, however, the courts ignored this distinction, thereby 
affairs, was unwilling to classify development within an ecologically sensitive area as 
a "harm," despite his recognition of the social benefits that would flow from the area's 
maintenance in its natural state. He therefore invalidated the challenged noncompen­
satory measure. The Just court, on the· other hand, expressly disagreed with Judge Hall, 
finding instead that development within ecologically sensitive areas is indeed a "harm." 
Sustaining a near-blanket prohibition on development in privately owned lauds within 
wetlands zones, it reasoned that "an owner of land has no absolute and unlimited 
right to change the essential natural character of his land so as to use it for a purpose 
for which it was unsuited in its natural state and which injures the rights of others," 
and concluded that _the police power may be used "to prevent harm to public rights 
by limiting the use of private property to its natural uses." Just v. Marinette County, 
supra at 17, 201 N.W.2d at 771. 
For some commentators the economic result sanctioned in Just is viewed as meri­
torious. As much appears, for example, in the argument of Bosselman, Callies, and 
Banta that "regulation of land, if reasonably related to a valid public purpose [such 
as environmental protection], can never constitute a taking." TAKING, supra note IO, 
at 2�8. S�e UsE OF LAND, supra note 2, at 1 75; Sax, Takings, Private Property and 
Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 156 ( 1 971).  Yet these authors caution that "we must 
not let . co.ncern for the environment blind us to the fact that regulations have real economic impact on real people, and we must search for solutions that will take their 
interests into account," TAKING, supra note IO, at 2, and that a proper construction 
of the taking clause "must be politically feasible .. . , make sense economically, ... 
and hold up in court." Id. at 318. How a construction of that clause which limits 
the requirement of compensation to the sole instance of "actual appropriation of land 
by �he government," id. at 254, is compatible with any of these · objectives, with the 
possible, if problematic, exception of the last, is regrettably left unaddressed in the 
authors' otherwise thoughtful and far-reaching examination of the taking issue. 
16. See p. 1 07 infra. 
17. A�on� Blackstone's better known, if somewhat cosmological, encomia to private 
property is his statement that, 
Th�re is nothin& which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the af­
fec�wns of mankmd, as the right to property; or that sole and despotic dominion 
which. one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe. 
2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES •2. 
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imbuing the American property system with a distinctive bias in fa­
vor of those deriving their wealth from land.18 But the pendulum has 
started back. Courts19 and commentators20 are beginning to stress 
the identity in principle of the expectations of land developers and 
other types of entrepreneurs regarding economic return on their 
respective investments.21 
The fourth trend i s  the gravitation of land use powers from local 
governments to regional, state, and federal agencies. National land 
use bills, 22 the proposed American Law Institute Model Land De­
velopment Code, 2s the "sensitive area" l egislation of many of the 
states,24 and the review of local land use decisions by regional agen­
cies25 are illustrative. 
Three consequences of this trend are pertinent.  First, restrictive 
police power measures that might not be sustained if evaluated with­
in a purely local context are more easily defended if scrutinized in 
terms of broader regional, state or national interests.26 Second, courts 
1 8. See notes 90·94 infra. 
19 .  See, e.g., Steel Hill Development, Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956, 
961 (1st Cir. 1972); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 1 2, 201 N.W.2d 761 ,  768 ( 1972). 
20. See, e.g., Johnston, Constitutionality of Subdivision Exactions: The Quest for 
a Rat ionale, 52 CORNELL L .Q. 871, 923 (1967); Cunn ingham , Public Control of Land 
Subdivision in Michigan: Description and Critique, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1, 25-33 ( 1967). 
2 1 .  The land subdivider, Professor Johnston properly observes, is a: 
manufac turer, processer, and marketer of a prod uct; land is bu t one of his raw 
materials. In subdivision control disputes, the developer is not defending hearth and 
home against the king's intrusion, but simply attemptin g to maximize his profits 
from the sale of a finished product. As applied to him , subdivision control exactions 
are actually business regulations. 
Johnston, supra note 20, at 923. 
22. See, e.g., S. 924, 93d Cong., lst Sess. ( 1 973) (Nixon bill); S. 268, 93d Cong .. 
1st Sess. (1973) (Jackson bill). 
23. ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CoDE (Tent. Drafts Nos. 2-5, 1970-73). 
24. See, e.g .• Maryland Wetlands Act, MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, §§ 718-30 (Supp. 1972); 
Florida Environm ental Land and Water Management Act of 1972, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380 
( 1 972); Virginia Wetlands Act, VA. CooE ANN. §§ 62.1 -13.2 to -13.9 (Supp. 197 3); cf. 
ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE art. 7, pt. 2 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1 97 1 ) .  
25. See, .e.g., Massachusetts Regional Planning Law, MASS. Al\N. LAWS ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (197 1 )  (review by state agency of local zoning decisions hindering the construction of 
low-income housing). 
26. Ex amples include measures imposing extraordinarily stringent controls upon the 
development of lands in the San Francisco Bay area, the Hac kensack Meadowlands of 
northern New J�·sey, and. th e  Lake Tah?e bi-st�te region. �ee CAL. Gov'r CODE �� 66600-61 (West Supp. 1 912). Demal of a permit to fill and btuld on a privately-owned tract 
along the Bay was urnmccessfully challenged in Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San 
Francisco .
B�y C?nserv. &: Dev . . co�rn·n .. 11 c:;ai. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. R ptr. 897 ( 1 971). The admm1strat1011 of the leg1slat1on smce Its passage is reviewed in F .  BossELMAN &: 
D. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL 108-35 (Council on Environ · 
mental Quality 197 1 ). See Hackensack Meadowlands Reclamation and Development Act, 
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 1 3.17-1  to 13.17-86 (1968). The statute was upheld in Meadowlands 
Regional Development Agency v .  State, 112 N.J. Super. 89, 270 A.2d 4 1 8  (1 970), aff'd, 
63 N.J. 35, 304 A.2d �45. (1 9J3). A two-year moratoriu m on selected development within the Meado"'.lands D1stnct imposed under the s tatute and implementing regulations 
was upheld m Meadowland Reg. Dev. Ag. v. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n, 1 1 9 
N.J. Super. 572, 293 A.2d 1 92 (App. Div. 1972). See Tahoe Reg. Planning Compact, CAL. 
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are more likely to defer to agencies at higher levels of government 
than to local governments, confident that the former have a better 
grasp of the entire picture, are endowed with more qualified planning 
staffs, and address land use concerns of overwhelming social and 
economic import for the area concerned.27 Finally, determining what 
is a reasonable return on undeveloped land such as a tract in Florida's 
Great Cypress Swamp28 or in the Hackensack Meadowlands29 will 
be shaped in large measure by the regional agency's overall devel­
opment plan as  well as by its capital improvements program. In a 
community where development patterns are already largely fixed, 
however, discrepancies between a return dictated by these expecta­
tions and one severely reduced as a result of bold public interven­
tion will be far more visible and hence more vulnerable to attack 
as an uncompensated taking. 
Finally local governments are experiencing growing sophistication 
in planning matters. Today's planning arsenal includes such elab­
orate techniques as timed development,30 flexible bulk and use regu­
lation,31 design review,32 zoning bonuses,33 and a host of other in­
novations.34 Goaded by federal35 and state planning assistance pro­
grams,36 moreover, many local governments are now predicating their 
Gov'T CODE § 6680 1 (West Supp. 1972), which has been approved by Congress (Pub. L. 
No. 91-148, 83 Stat. 360 (1969)). The statute \\"as sustairnid in People ex rel. Younger v. 
County of El Dorado, 5 Cal. 3d 480, 487 P.2d 1 1 93, 96 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1971). 
27. See cases cited note 26 supra. See generally Heyman, Innovative Land Regulation 
and Comprehensive Planning, in THE NEW ZONING: LEGAL, ADMINISTRATIVE AND ECONOMIC 
CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES 23 (N. Marcus & M. Groves eds. 1970) [hereinafter cited as 
NEW ZONING]. 
28. The development pressures threatening the Great Cypress Swamp are detailed in 
Comment, Jetport: Planning and Politics in the Big Cypress Swamp, 25 U. MIAMI L. 
REV, 71 3 (1971). . 
29. See note 26 supra. 
30. See, e.g., Golden v. Planning Board, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 29 1 ,  334 N.Y.S.2d 
138 ( 1972); Josephs v. Town Board, 24 Misc. 2<l 366, 198 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. 1960). 
31. See, e.g., Chrinko v. South Brunswick Twp. Planning Bd., 77 N.J. Super. 594, 
187 A.2d 221 (L. Div. 1963) (flexible bulk regulation through cluster zoning); Cheney 
v. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc., 429 Pa. 626, 241 A.2d 81 (1 968) (flexible bulk and use 
regulation through planned unit development zoning). 
32. See NEW YORK, N.Y. ZONING RESOLUTION art. VII, ch. 4, § 74-792(5) (1971) (au­
thorizing design review of the compatibility of proposed construction with designated 
New York City landmark buildings). 
33. A zoning bonus is an additional increment of density that the municipality 
aw�rds to th� developer as a quid pro quo for the inclusion in his project of a pre­
scnbed amemty, such as a plaza or an arcade. In theory, the amount of the density 
increment should equal or slightly exceed in value the cost of the amenity. See J. 
CosTONIS, SPACE ADRIFT: LANDMARK PRESERVATION AND THE MARKETPLACE 30-32 (forth­
coming 1974) [hereinafter cited as SPACE ADRIFT] . 
34. See generally NEW ZONING, supra note 27, passim; Elliott & Marcus, From ,Euclid 
to Ramapo: New Directions in Land Development Control, I HOFSTRA L. REV. 56 (1973). 
35. Federal planning assistance programs are summarized hr D. HAGMAN, PUBLIC 
PLANNING AND CONTROL OF URBAN AND LAND DEVELOPMENT .17-58, 62-71, 73-75 (1973). 
36. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-201 et seq. (1970); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, 
§ 63bl4-14.18 (1971). 
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land use decisions upon thorough planning studies whose conclusions 
are express components of duly enacted comprehensive plans. 
Given these developments, stringent land use measures are less 
easily attacked on taking grounds for two reasons. First, i nstead of 
imposing restrictions ou tright, local governments proceed by less 
visible but equally onerous routes. Astute communities no longer 
flatly proscribe unwanted development. Rather, they make it the 
subject of involved special exception procedures, reviewing it on a 
case by case basis and approving it, i f  a t  all, pursuant to discre­
tionary criteria and detailed conditions.37 Second, once the courts are 
persuaded that a challenged measure is the product of thoughtful 
planning inquiries, they are less likely to quibble with its economic 
consequences. as 
The apparent weakening of the compensation requiremen t  does not 
mean, however, that the land use dilemma. is nearing satisfactory reso­
l ution. Many land use conflicts will remai n  troublesome because of 
their distinctly local character, as in the case of the Tudor Parks con­
troversy, or because of the visibly disproportionate burdens that their 
resolution under the police power threatens to foist off on a tiny 
class of landowners, as il lustrated by the Stock Exchange conflict.39 
Furthermore the current or continu ing influence of the five trends 
sketched above cannot be confidently predicted for any given state. 
Each is controversial and a certain target of continuing litigation by 
developers and landowners, who can be e xpected to invoke ample 
precedents that clash w ith the ambitious concept of the police power 
that these trends signal. 
In any event the question would remain even if the whittling 
away of the compensation requirement gained widespread legal sup­
port. Although deemed constitutional, this solution might not be fair 
or politic, for the issue is not whether resource protection is meri­
torious but who should pay for it. Denying greater density to the 
l andowner in the foregoing examples makes him the u nwilling fi-
37. See Golden v. Planning Board, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 285 N.E.2d 291 
(1972). These procedural and regulatory refinements abound in the cases cited note 
10 supra. 
38. Professor Heyman persuasively argues that the taking objection often serves as 
a c�nvenien.t cover inv?ked by cou�·ts to invalidate a. measure because it is the product of ill-conceived planning. Innovative Land Regulation and Comprehensive Planning, 
i n  NEW ZONING, supra note 27, at 26-32. 64-65. 
39. An analysis of the decrease in value that would be sustained if four Chicago 
School of Architecture buildings were permanently designated as landmarks revealed 
an average drop in the fair market value of these properties of 52.l percent or, stated 
in dollar terms, an aggregate loss of $8,732,000. See SPACE ADRIFT, suf>ra note 33, at 
76, table 6. Greater relative losses can be anticipated when no income-producing im­
provements are permitted on the restricted resource site. 
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nanc1er of a resource that the community desires. In addition, the 
land of other p roperty owners, unaffected by the stringent controls, 
may become more valuable,40 a result aptly described by Professor 
Hagman as the "windfall/wipe-out" phenomenon.41 Public measures 
that create windfalls for some by gouging others surely ought to be 
avoided if possible, whatever their constitutional status.42 
Political realities must also be t aken into account since the im­
plementation of action programs, not the vindication of an abstract 
constitutional p rinciple, is ultimately at stake. The views of com­
mentators for whom the compensation requirement is outmoded not­
withstanding, 43 implementing action programs will be difficult, if not 
impossible, without strong governmental commitment and the co­
operation or acquiescence of affected private groups. Noncompensa­
tory measures that severely reduce economic return on private prop­
erty are unlikely candidates on both counts. Few public officials and 
administrators are eager to back controversial programs that threaten 
to antagonize potent interest groups. It is certain that real estate and 
other potentially burdened interests will attempt to block such meas­
ures. One need look no further than the increasing signs of an en­
vironmental b acklash, abetted by the nation's ravenous energy de­
mands,44 for the stormclouds that lie ahead. 
40. This result is known among land economists as the problem of "shifting value." 
As described b y  Turvey: · 
Where land is withdrawn from the area available for building, the value of the 
prospect of building increment on the remaining land is increased by the actual 
value of the prospect thus extinguished on the withdrawn land. 
Turvey, Development Charges and the Compensation-Betterment Problem, 63 ECON. 
J. 299, 300 (1953). 
41. See F. BossELMAN & D. CALLIES, supra note 26, at 24-27; D. HAGMAN, supra note 35, 
at 550 n.k. A glaring example exists in Hawaii where harsh restrictions upon develop­
ment in that state's "conservation zones" have caused substantial increases in the value 
of private lands located in "urban zones," districts in which higher densities are per­
mitted as a matter of right. In July 1973, Professor Hagman received a com­
prehensive planning and research demonstration grant (Project No. California PD- 13) 
from the U.S. Dep't of Housing and Urban Development for a study entitled "Wind­
falls and Wipeouts: The Quiet Undoing of Land-Use Controls." The study will identify 
and appraise the extent to which a variety of land use and public finance techniques, 
including development rights transfer, are likely to distribute the burdens and benefits 
of public land use regulation more equitably than occurs under existing practice. 
42. For a thoughtful analysis of the link between the Fifth Amendment and the 
"windfall/wipeout" phenomenon, see Wexler, Betterment Recovery: A Financial Pro­
posal for Sounder Land Use Planning, 3 YALE REV. OF L. & Soc. ACTION 192, 200-04 (1973). 
43. See authorities cited note 15 supra. 
44. The "energy crisis" has already made serious inroads in the environmental gains 
of recent years. President Nixon has urged the states and cities to relax their air 
pollution regulations to allow the burning of high-sulfur fuel to avert "a very serious" 
shortage of heating fuel in 1973-74. N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1973, § l, at 1, col. 8. In 
August 1973, the House and Senate in different forms approved the Trans-Alaskan 
Pipeline Authorization Act which will expedite construction of the pipeline by, inter 
alia, declaring that the Secretary of the U.S. Dep't of Interior has complied with 
pertinent requirements of federal environmental legislation and by substantially im­
munizing the building of the pipeline from further judicial challenge. See 119 Cong. 
Rec. 7216-7309 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1973). 
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It cannot be doubted that the American property system has erred 
i n  treating land as a commodity for trade, virtually ignoring its status 
as a community resource. But it is far from clear that a precipitous 
jump to the emasculation of the compensation requirement is the 
proper way to remedy the environmental degradation traceable in 
part to the system's bias favoring private property rights. 
That requirement, as interpreted in this century, buttresses two 
social functions of property that are perilous to ignore. The first is 
property's role as guarantor of individual liberties, a role affirmed 
in  the Magna Carta) by Coke and Blackstone, 45 and by contemporary 
commentators, such as Charles Reich .46 Concededly, courts have con­
strued this function overbroadly in sheltering land entrepreneurs 
from public regulation. But that concession hardly establishes that 
the latter should be totally deprived of the safeguards afforded by 
the compensation requirement in instances other than actual physical 
appropriation. And i t  is simply wrong to assume that environmental 
m easures will burden fat cat developers while leaving untouched pri­
vate citizens generally, the class most in need of these safeguards. 
The concern for individual liberties should not be dismissed as a 
star-spangled cloak for anti-environmental behavior. A recent report 
of the Task Force on Land Use and Urban Growth adverts repeatedly 
to instances of the "visceral . . . 'damned-if-we-want-urbanization' 
response"47 parading u nder the environmental banner48 and cautions 
that the new mood "encompasses a range of negative attitudes that 
are sometimes confused and even hostile to the needs of our society 
for new development."49 
The institution of private property also provides the framework of 
incentives in response to which land development occurs in the 
American economy. A blunderbuss assault on the compensation re­
quirement will inevitably weaken that framework, hindering rational 
decisions respecting commerce in land. Land is neither wholly a so­
cial resource nor a commodity for trade. Its hybrid character war­
rants continued, if somewhat modified, recognition of the entitlement 
of land entrepreneurs to the security of transactions that the American 
economic system affords to merchants generally. Despite the advo-
45. For an account of the evolution of this notion from its origins in the Magna 
Carta to the writings of Coke and Blackstone, see TAKING, supra note IO, at 53-60 75-81 
88-92, 100-02. 
' ' 
46. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771 (1964). 
47. UsE OF LAND, supra note 2, at 60 (quoting an observer's reaction to a population 
limitation referendum in Boulder City, Colorado). 
48. See id. at 33, 42, 52-61, 89-94, 100-01. 
49. Id. at 17. 
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cacy of "no-growth" policies from various quarters, 50 moreover, it is 
certain, as the Task Force on Land Use and Urban Growth docu­
ments, that "grow we will."51 In light of land's hybrid character and 
of the certainty of further growth, it would be tragic to dissipate the 
opportunities created by America's "new mood" toward its environ­
ment by seeking to clamp restraints on the property system that are 
inequitable and probably unworkable. Instead, these opportunities 
should be seized to refashion the property system to accommodate 
the nation's environmental needs with a redefined conception of the 
legitimate economic expectations of those deriving their wealth from 
land. 
One technique for achieving this accommodation is development 
rights transfer. It stands squarely upon a principle which has been 
implicit in American land use practice since the Euclid decision: The 
development potential of privately-held land is in part a community 
asset that government may allocate to enhance the general welfare. 
This article is divided into three sections. The first sets forth two 
applications of the development rights transfer technique and dis­
cusses its advantages over conventional resource protection approaches. 
The second section explores the legal difficulties inherent in view­
ing private property as partially a community asset. The final sec­
tion identifies subsidiary issues in the economics and planning realms 
that are likely to arise when resource protection programs employing 
the transfer technique are implemented. 
I. Development Rights Transfer: The Concept and Its Operation 
The basic cause of the land use conflicts described above is the 
destruction of the development potential and hence market value of 
affected sites o r  areas. The same site cannot support a landmark and 
a modern office tower, or a nature preserve and a polluting industrial 
plant. By assuming that the development potential of a site may be 
used only on that site, the property system makes an either /or choice 
inevitable: the landmark or the tower, the nature preserve or the 
plant. Depending upon the choice, constitutional challenge or amen­
ity loss is the predictable outcome. 
Development rights transfer breaks the linkage between particu­
lar land and its development potential by permitting the transfer of 
that potential, or "development rights," to land where greater density 
50. Id. at 50-53. 
51. Id. at 75. 
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will not be obj ectionable.52 In freeing the bottled-up development 
rights for use elsewhere, the technique avoids the either /or dilemma 
because it both protects the threatened resource and enables the 
owner of the restricted site to recoup t he economic value rep­
resented by the site's frozen potential. The mechanics of this flexible 
approach are set forth in two contexts below. 
A. Landmark Preservation: The Chicago Plan 
One proposal, the Chicago Plan,53 i llustrates how the transfer tech­
nique may be employed to preserve u rban landmarks. The city would 
begin by designating a "developmen t  rights transfer district," an area 
within which the u nu sed development righ ts of landmark sites could 
be transferred.54 The boundaries of this district would be drawn to 
i nclude the area of the city in which most of i ts downtown land­
marks are concentrated. The purposes of this boundary requirement 
are threefold: first, the area would probably offer the most lucra tive 
market for these rights because land val ues are likely to be high ; 
second, the low density landmarks would offset to some extent the 
i ncreased density permitted on transferee s i tes by serving as l ight and 
a i r  parks sprinkled throughout the area ; a nd th ird, the area would 
ordinarily contain a h igh concentration o f  the city's public services 
and facilities, enabling i t  to handle the redistributed density and 
concomitant population with greater efficiency than other sections 
o f  the city. 
Upon the designation of a building as a landmark its owner would 
be entitled to sell i ts u nused developmen t  rights to owners of non­
landmark sites within the transfer district. In addition, the landmark 
owner would enjoy a healthy reduction in his real estate tax bill 
because his site, shorn of its former rights, would drop sharply in 
value. He would be allowed to transfer the rights to one or more 
s ites, but increased bulk on individual transferee sites would be 
held to rigorous ceilings to prevent esthetic blight by buildings that 
dwarf their neighbors. The landmark owner would then be obligated 
52. The literature on 'development rights transfer is sparse, the principal st udies 
including SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 33; Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zo11i11g 
a�d the Pr�servatio11 of Urban La�dma!·ks, 85 HARV. L. REV. 574 (19i2) [herein after 
cited as Chicago Plan ] ; Marcus, Air Rights Transfers in New York Cit-v, 36 LAW & 
CoNTEMP. PROB. 372 (1971) ;  Note, Development Rights Tra 11sfei- i11 New York City, 82 
YALE L.J. 338 (1 972). The transfer technique, as applied in New York City, is further 
described in Elliott & Marcus, supra note 34, at 72-78. 
53. See Chicago Plan, supra note 52. The simplified description that follows in text 
of the Chicago Plan, as originally devised by the au thor, is drawn from this article. 
54 . . The amount of transf�rabl� rights for any given landmark site is measured by t�e difference betwee'?- the mtenor square footage allowed for a building on that 
site under present zoning and the square footage that the landmark actually contains . 
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to maintain the building in accordance with sound b uilding man­
agement practices. 
A dual bulk system would regulate densities on nonlandmark sites 
within the transfer district. Landowners who declined to purchase 
development rights would be governed by the lower ceilings of the 
bulk district, the "residual zone," within which their land was lo­
cated when the transfer district was established. Purchasers of de­
velopment rights, on the other hand, would enjoy additional density 
in amounts proportional to their p urchases ; increases i n  the value 
of their land attributable to the extra density would determine the 
price that they would pay for these rights. 
If a landmark owner rejected the transfer option a nd insisted in­
stead upon a cash award or the right to redevelop his site, the city 
would be empowered to obtain a preservation restriction by pur­
chasing or condemning the as-ye t  unused rights. Acquisition costs 
and other expenses of this program would be funded through a "de­
velopment rights bank." The bank would serve as a pool for the 
development rights acquired from recalcitrant owners a s  well as those 
donated by owners of other landmarks or transferred from publicly 
owned landmarks. The city would finance program costs out of a 
revolving fund created by selling these pooled rights, subject to 
the same urban design controls that apply to private owners. The 
bank's start-u p  funds would derive, in most cases, from sale of the 
development rights of one or more publicly owned landmarks. 
With the transfer of its development rights elsewhere, the land­
mark property loses its speculative · appeal. Because i t  remains in 
private hands, the city avoids outlays for fee acquisition, restoration, 
and maintenance and can continue to tax it but a t  a lesser rate. 
The reduced tax yield of the landmark property, however, will be 
largely offset by the increased taxes paid by owners o f  the more 
profitable buildings that go up o n  transferee sites. 
B. Environmental Protection: A Proposal for the 
Phosphorescent Bay 
I .  From Landmarks to Nature Preserves 
Subsequent empirical investigation of the Chicago Plan's feasi­
bility55 has suggested two refinements which merit review because 
55. In June 1 972, the U.S. Dep't of Housing and Urban Development awarded an 
urban demonstration grant to the National Trust for Historic Preservation to examine 
the legal, economic, and planning feasibility of  the Chicago Plan, using the threatened 
Chicago School of Architecture landmarks in  Chicago's Loop as the principal, though 
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they form a bridge between the applica tion of development rights 
transfer in the specialized context of urban l andmark preservation 
and its more ambitious use for environmenta l  goals. They a lso call 
a ttention to the need for a fundamental shift in the rationale sup­
porting the technique and require a consideration of the thesis that 
the developmen t potential of private lan d  ought to be regarded in 
part as a public resource. 
The recommendation that transfer districts be coextensive with 
areas of landmark concentration is the subject of the first refinement. 
In some cities districting on this basis cou ld prove unduly restric­
tive. These areas may already be congested due to poor plann ing or 
successfu l lobbying by real estate interests for excessive bulk al­
lowances. 56 The recommendation could compound faulty urban de­
sign i n  these cases even though the Plan calls only for the redis­
tribution of presently au thorized bulk, not for the creation of further 
density.57 The recommendation also may not be workable in cities 
whose landmarks are widely sca ttered. Ei ther the entire city must 
become a transfer district, a suggestion fraught with distressing plan­
ning complications, or only a portion of i t, in which case landmarks 
outside the district will  not be protected. Furthermore, the recom· 
mendation could prevent a city from u ti lizing other opportun ities 
not exclusive, focus of the inquiry. The author served as project director of this study, 
the economic inquiry being conducted by Real Estate Research Corporation of Chicago, 
Illinois, and the urban design investigation by the Okamoto Associates of San Francisco, 
California. The results of this study, which are recounted in Space Adrift, were not 
available when the Chicago Plan was initially worked out . Instead, an earlier rudimentary 
empirical study coauthored by the author with Jared Shlaes, a Chicago realtor, was 
used. See Development Rights Transfer: A Solution to Chicago's Landmarks Dilemma 
(Chicago Chapter Foundation of the American Institute of Architects & National Trust 
for Historic Preservation, May 13,  1971). 
56. The use of development rights transfer to preserve landmarks in New York 
City, see NEW YoRK, N.Y. ZONING RESOLUTION art. VIII, ch. 4, §§ 74-79, 74-791 to .793 
(1�7 1), has been shari;ily criticized on this ground. See Note, supra note 52, at 351 -:'13;  
Dissent fro� Resolut10n CP-� l l 66 of the New York City Planning Comm'n to the 
Board of Est1�ate, May 13 ,  1 9 ; 0  (c?mments of Planning Board member Spatt on amend­
ment expandmg use of the techmque). These criticisms are manifestations of a more 
f':1n�amental . eroblem-.the pred�minant. �nfluence of the real estate community in nggmg mumc1pa� spatial allocat10n pohc1es to serve its special interests. For a case 
study demonstratmg that bulk zoning in Chicago's central business district is little 
more than a developer's bonanza, see SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 33, at 80-86, 9 5 - 1 04. 
See generally E. HIGBEE, THE SQUEEZE: CITIES WITHOUT SPACE ( 1 960); s. TOLL, ZONED 
AMERICAN (1969). 
57. �his distinction can be i�lustrated by comparing zoning bonuses with develop­
�ent rights transfe�s. In affordmg the dev�loper a "bonus" of additional density in ietu�n f<;>r an amemty such as a plaz� fu.rmshed a t. the developer's expense, the com­mumty mcreases the amou�t of density. m the residual zone by the amount of the 
bonus space. But �o .such mcrease occurs when a development rights purchaser con­structs a l�rger bmldmg because the aug_mented bulk of his building is offset by a C?rrespondmg decrease m the bulk permitted on the. landmark site from which the nghts are transferred. See notes 33 supra, 203 infra. See· generally Chicago Plan supra 
note 52, at 575-78, 594-96. · · · ' 
88 
Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay 
that the transfer technique offers for improved urban design includ­
ing, for example, dispersal or concentration of selected land uses, 
establishment of high rise elements at defined locations, and opti­
mization of transit system use. 58 I f  the areas within which additional 
density is desirable were some distance from the city's landmarks, 
the Plan's subsidiary urban design advantages could not be realized. 
Cities may therefore consider the alternative of mapping transfer 
districts independently of areas of  landmark concentration.59 
The second refinement relates to the consequences of the Plan's 
adoption for existing density levels within areas that are selected 
as transfer districts. Under the dual bulk system described earlier, 
the density prescribed for nonlandmark sites either remains un­
changed or, if their owners purchase development rights, actually 
increases. Density would not be deliberately skewed downward, 
whether to create a market for the rights or to overcome urban 
design complications that may result from density transfers. The 
dual bulk system is thus essentially an instance of density zoning, 
which prescribes a maximum amount of bulk for an area as a whole 
and permits developers to concentrate or disperse that density on 
individual lots within the area in accordance with flexible site plan­
ning criteria.60 Under this conception the total density for the entire 
transfer district is fixed by the bulk regulations of the residual zones 
included within the district's boundaries. Analogous to clustered 
subdivisions61 or planned unit developments (PUD's)62-also examples 
of density zoning-the Plan treats the overall district as a single tract, 
permitting the potential density of transferee sites to increase as that 
of landmark sites decreases. 
Pragmatic considerations dictated the decision to base the Chicago 
Plan on the density zoning rationale. Politically, the Plan's chances 
for adoption would plummet if it called for reduction of existing 
densities in the city's prime development area. America's cities are 
58. See SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 33, at 50, 1 36. 
59. Id. at 50, 5 1 .  
60. See Chicago Plan 620-28. Traditional bulk zoning, on the other hand, allocates 
density on a lot by lot basis and does not permit the maximum density ·on any lot 
within a bulk district to exceed that of any other lot there. 
61. Cluster zoning ordinances offer the developer a trade: if he agrees to devote 
a prescribed percentage of his subdivision tract to a com!Jltmity use, such as a park 
or schoolground, he is authorized in return to build the same number of residential 
units on the remaining portion of this tract that he formerly could have built on 
the tract as a whole. See URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, NEW APPROACHES TO RESIDENTIAL LAND 
DEVELOPMENT (Tech. Bull. No. 40, 1961); w. WHYTE, CLUSTER DEVELOPMENT (1964). 
62. In addition to offering the same flexibility regarding density allocation as cluster 
ordinances, PUD zoning ordinances relax building type and use restrictions. See Goldston 
& Scheuer, Zoning of Planned Residential Developments, 73 HARV. L. REV. 241 (1959); 
Symposium, Planned Unit Development, 1 14 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1965). 
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addicted to chronic growth fantasiesG3 and municipal politicians are 
loath to take on the banks, chambers of commerce, and other boosters 
of bigness in their cities.64 Given the relatively small number 0£ 
landmarks and hence limited amount of density to be transferred in 
any city, moreover, neither the Plan's marketing nor its urban de­
sign requirements are likely to demand recourse to this contro­
versial approach. 
From a legal perspective there seemed even less reason to embrace 
deliberate downzoning. Density zoning has been firmly endorsed by 
the courts since its inception two decades ago,65 but they have not 
spoken to the legitimacy of deliberately downzoning or its equivalent, 
refusing to upzone a n  area,66 in order to buttress the market for 
development rights or to avoid the urban design complications. Ju­
dicial approval of these practices would be tantamount to endorse­
ment of the principle that the developmen t potential of private 
property is in part a community resource. While the principle merits 
j udicial approval, the density zoning rationale offered a less risky, 
though fully adequate, foundation for the original version of the Plan. 
It is impossible to sidestep this problem, h owever, if transfer dis­
tricts are mapped independently of areas of landmark concentration. 
Consider, for example, a proposal that the residents of the H istoric 
Georgetown District i n  Washington, D.C., advanced to facilitate res­
toration of the waterfront bordering the District.G7 They were dis­
tressed with the d eterioration of the wa terfront into an industrial 
slum and with a zon ing ordinance which permitted large bui ldings 
that would destroy the District's dimensional scale. Furthermore, the 
construction of Washington's new Metro subway system had created 
pressures for removal of the ten-story height limit that Congress 
imposed on the city i n  19 10 to insure that the Capitol dominates 
63. Chicago's recently proposed comprehensive plan has been described as a "super 
plan." Chicago Sun Times, June 15, 1973, at 4, col. 1 .  
64. See note 56 supra. 
65. See Chicago Plan, supra note 52, at 623-25; notes 1 89-90 infra. 
66. Because changin.g t�e status quo is usually more productive of troublesome legal consequences than leavm� It unchanged, the suggested equivalence of a deliberate down­
zoning of existing ?ensities and a deliberate refusal to upzone them may appear 
anomalous . . 1'.he sub3ect of lc:gal . challenge, howeve�, wou Id not be these actions per sc, but the leg1t1macy of the ob3ect1ves that they are m tended to serve. As the discussions 
of t�e Chicago P_lan, p. 86 supra, and of t�e Geo:getown proposal ,  text accom· panymg note . 67 mfrn, make clear, the respecu�e act10ns fulfill identical objectives, 
namely, �reauon of . a market for . development nghts and avoidance of urban design �om.phcations re�ultmg from density transfers. Hence, a determination that these ob-
1ect1ves fall outside the scope ?£ the zoning or, more largely, the police power would 
seem as fatal when a community refuses to upzone as when it deliberately downzones for this purpose. 
67. See Von Eckardt, Getting Charm and Height, Wash. Post, Feb. 27, 1971 ,  § C, at 
1, col. 5; Chicago Plan, supra note 52, at 596 n.74. 
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the skyline. Accordingly, the Georgetowners urged that presently un­
used development rights along the waterfront be transferred for use 
downtown in h igh density development adjoining the M e tro route. 
This strategy would provide funds for waterfront restoration, pre­
vent high density development there, avoid urban design problems 
that could arise if this density were transferred to other sections of 
predominantly low density Georgetown, and encourage efficient transit 
system use by channeling additional density along the M etro route. 
But this plan also anticipates that densities permitted as of right 
along the Metro would be set at levels lower than those that would 
have been fixed if no rights were to be transferred there. Otherwise, 
developers might have no incentive to purchase the transferred rights. 
Nor would the low density ameni ty-the restored waterfront-be lo­
cated within the area of redistribut ed density. The balance of high 
density for low that occurs when transfer districts overlap areas of 
landmark concentration would therefore be sacrificed. 
Adapting the transfer technique to the larger task of environmental 
protection will require that transfer districts be located outside of 
environmentally sensitive areas and that densities permitted as of 
right in the districts be deliberately skewed downward. Both features 
appear in the following transfer proposal which takes as its focal 
point Puerto Rico's embattled Phosphorescent Bay. 
2. Salvation for the Dino/ lagellates 
In common with other ecologically fragile areas, the Phosphor­
escent Bay faces the spectre of grave harm through high density 
development. Highway construction and other capital improvements 
have rendered i ts formerly remote location accessible a n d  the pros­
pect of additional jobs for the island's underemployed work force 
makes commercial development a ttractive to its political leaders. 
Soaring land values, moreover, have made the cost of public ac­
quisition of the Bay lands prohibitive and rock bottom real estate 
taxes encourage owners of these lands to hold their property off 
the market in anticipation of windfall profits. The Bay, i n  short, 
epitomizes the threatened environmental resource whose plight can­
not be remedied by recourse to conventional land use controls or 
public financing techniques. 
Development rights transfer may substantially alleviate the threat 
which economic forces pose to the Bay. The proposal set forth here 
has been conceived without the benefit of planning and economic 
studies such as those used in formulating and refining the Chicago 
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Plan6s and is therefore tentative. 69 At a mm1mum, however, it serves 
as a useful point of departure for subsequent discussion of the legal, 
planning, and economic issues that must be confronted in employing 
the transfer techn ique for environmental protection. 
The proposal proceeds from two givens : the general pattern of 
development i n  Pu erto Rico and the existing regulatory powers of 
the Puerto Rico Planning Board. Crudely defined, Puerto Rico's 
land mass comprehends three types of areas : urban, nonurban, and 
transitional. The principal urban areas are the coastal cities con­
taining most of the population and industry. Nonurban sections in­
clude the rugged interior and the coastal sections lying between the 
built-up areas where most of the island's environmentally sensitive 
locations are found. Transitional areas surround the cities and are 
imminent targets for residential and commercial development. 
Although largely the brainchild of Rexford Tugwell some thirty 
years ago, the Puerto Rico Planning Board70 was given powers ·which 
anticipate remarkably well the trend toward a more influential plan­
n ing role for regional and state agencies. The board, for example, ex­
ercises its powers throughout the island, not simply within unincor­
porated areas.71 Moreover, it zones only the land within urban areas ;72 
development in other areas is subject to case by case approval.73 In 
addition, the board must prepare an island-wide comprehensive plan,74 
which may address the subject of natural resource protection75 as well 
as other land use and social welfare concerns of the island. 
68. See note 55 supra. 
69. In early 1973, the author and Real Estate Research Corporation received an 
invitation from Francisco J. Blanco, executive director of the Conservation Trust of 
Puerto Rico to investigate the possibility of employing development rights transfer to pro­
tect Puerto Rico's dwindling environmental resources. The background ·information con­
cerning Puerto Rico is largely derived from preliminary interviews conducted by the 
author and Robert S. DeVoy, senior vice-president, Real Estate Research Corporation, 
with Puerto Rican governmental officials, lenders, developers, and realtors, and from the 
publication, Puerto Rico Planning Board, Land Use Policies: A Draft for Discussion 
(1970). The author gratefully acknowledges Messrs. DeVoy and Bianco's many useful com­
ments on the Puerto Rico proposal. 
70. See Puerto Rico Planning and Budget Act, P .R. LAws ANN. tit. 23, �� 1 -225 
(Supp. 1 972). For regulations implementing the Act, see RULES A�D REGULATioNs or 
P UERTO RICO tit. 23, §§i 1 -225 ( 1 973). 
7 1 .  See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 23, § 6a (Supp. 1 972). · 
72 . . . see id. § 9(1). Z?oi�g regulations may also be applied to lands outside of urban 
areas when such apphcat10n serves to control urban development by preserving [these 
lands] for agricultural purposes." Id. 
73. See id. §§ 9(3), 25; RULES AND REGULATIONS OF PUERTO Rico tit. 23 §§ 10 - 1 to -45 1 
( 1 973). 
' 
74. See P_.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 23, §§ 6a(2), 9 (Supp. 1 972). 
75. See 1�. § 6a(2). The Board _is also authorized to employ its zoning power to preserve agricultural land and provide greenbelts around u rban areas and along high· 
ways. See id._ § 9(1). W?ether these sections would permit the Board to create the 
Planned. �nv1ronmental Zon.es re_ferred to subsequently in text is not clear. Cf. Land Use Pohc1es: A. �raft f�r D_1scuss10n, supra note 69, at 69 (questioning authority of the Board under ex1stmg leg1slat1on to create "conservation districts"). 
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The Phosphorescent Bay and the island's other environmentally 
sensitive resources could be safeguarded in the following manner. 
First, the planning board would prepare an inventory of the island's 
known environmentally sensitive areas, much as the municipal land­
marks commission inventories landmarks under the Chicago Plan. 
Second, the board would designate these areas as Protective Environ­
mental Zones (PEZ's) and prescribe criteria and related procedures 
for designating other areas in the future. Development within a PEZ 
that threatens the protected resource would be flatly prohibited. Other 
forms of development, however, would be permitted if they comport 
with applicable planning criteria of a nonenvironmental nature. 
Regulating the PEZ in this manner would assure protection of the 
resource and would minimize governmental interference with pri­
vate ownership. Permitting a broad range of alternative uses short 
of those threatening environmental harm, moreover, would avoid 
effective challenge to the PEZ designation as a taking i n  many cases, 
and it would reduce the amoun t  o f  the condemnation award that 
might be constitutionally or statutorily required in others.76 
Third, property owners within a PEZ would be permitted to chal­
lenge the PEZ designation and regulations before the board. 77 The 
designation · an d  regulations would remain unchanged if the board 
concluded that they were not constitutionally objectionable or, in 
the alternative, that they permitted a return in excess of the minimum 
prescribed by statute. If it found the designation or regulations de­
fective, the board could opt to compensate the owners, measuring 
the award either by the difference between the highest return that 
is possible under the uses permitted in the PEZ and the minimum 
return that is required to satisfy constitutional requirements, or by 
the difference between actual return and that fixed b y  statute. The 
board could also cure the constitutional objection by a ppropriately 
76. See pp. 1 22-23 infra. 
77. For examples of comparable procedures under existing law, see New York City 
Landmarks Ordinance, NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CooE ANN. ch. 8-A, �§ 207-1.0q, 207-8.0 
(1971); Massachusetts Wetlands Law, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 130, § 105 (Supp. 
1971).  The New York ordinance enables an owner of a designated landmark building. 
to compel either the lifting of formal landmark status-and its attendant restrictions on 
the building's alteration or demolition-or public acquisition of the bui lding if he 
demonstrates through administrative proceedings that the landmark property is unable 
to earn a reasonable return. The Massachusetts statute similarly empowers the owner 
of land wi�hin a designated wetlands area to secure either compensation or Jemoval 
of the wetlands designation and related use restrictions if the latter are deemed con­
fiscatory. The owner, however, must seek relief before a court, not an administrative 
agency. For an account of the statute and its administration, see F. BossELMAN & D. 
CALLIES, supra note 26, at 205·16. 
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liberalizing the restrictions.78 Decisions of the board would, of co urse, 
be subject to judicial review. 
Finally, the board would fund compensation awards t hrough sale 
of the claimant's otherwise frozen developmen t potential for use in 
transfer districts located elsewhere on the island. Although these 
districts would serve the same marketing function as those cal led 
for under the Chicago Plan, they would differ in four key respects. 
First, they would not be located in a s ingle city or in one,. of i ts 
sections; rather, they would be found throughout the island, prin­
cipally in transitional areas but possibly in selected urban areas as 
well.79 Second, because of this locational ·  difference, the medium of 
transfer would not be floor area as u nder the Chicago Plan, but 
some other form of liberalized development control proportioned in 
dollar value to the frozen potential of the restricted parcel. Using 
floor area as the medium of exchange would not be feasible in Puerto 
Rico because transfers are more likely to occur between dissimilar 
districts, such as rai n  forests and residen tial zones. 
Third, the two refinements to the original version of the Chicago 
P lan-mapping transfer districts independently of the protected re­
source and skewing downwards the residual densities with i n  tra nsfer 
districts-would probably be employed rou tinely in Puerto Rico. The 
risk that high density poses for ecologically fragile resources will 
often require that it be removed from PEZ's al together. Density zon­
ing, under which bulk is redistribu ted on a physically contiguous 
land area, may not be feasible when transfer districts are located far 
from the protected resource. These di fferences can be illustrated by 
comparing the transfer of density from Bay lands to a residential 
subdivision forty miles away with the transfer of 60,000 square feet 
of floor area (approximately two stories) from a landmark in a cen­
tral business district to a site two blocks away. If residual densities 
within the subdivision already equal the maximum that the pre­
vailing market for new construction wou ld absorb and that substan­
tive planning criteria j ustify, the transferred densi ty would not only 
be unsalable but, if used within the subdivision, could cause con­
gestion and poor design results as well. Nei ther problem would 
78. A similar approach is advocated in Bosselman, The Th ird A lternative in Zo11i1ia 
Litigation, 17 ZONING DIGEST 1 1 3, 1 1 6 - 1 7  ( 1 965); ALI 1\101.)EL LAND DEVELOPMENT Coo� 





ions of Puerto Rico's cities are un<ler<l�v�lopc<l, causing inefficient usage of 
the island s small land .mass. See Land Use Pohc1�s :  . A Draft for Discussion, supra note 69, at 48-5 1 .  Targetmg .these are.as as transfer d1stncts and encouraging their rede­velopment to more appropnale density levels would produce more efficient urban de­
velopment patterns. 
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arise under the Chicago Plan because the additional two stories of 
the landmark site would merely be added to a nearby site zoned, 
perhaps, for forty stories and surrou nded by predominantly high-rise 
construction. 80 
Finally, a uthority to transfer density would be vested solely in the 
planning board rather than shared with property owners in PEZ's. 
By allowing transfers to major development areas throughout the is­
land, the Puerto Rico program enhances the probability that devel­
opment rights transfer can produce beneficial plann ing results in 
addition to providing resource protection. It has been observed, for 
example, that key areas of certain Puerto Rican cities are under­
built, contrary to the island's preference for compact rather than 
sprawling development. 81 Enabling the planning board, in its dis­
cretion, to transfer density to these areas would resolve this problem 
with greater certainty than if private owners also enj oyed the trans­
fer option. Bookkeeping under the Puerto Rican program, more­
over, would be complicated by the wider geographical scope of the 
transfers and by the nonhomogeneity of the types o f  development 
occurring on transferor and transferee sites. Exclusive planning board 
administration of density transfers would seem the more advisable 
course for dealing with these complications as well. 
C. Development Rights Transfer: A Positive Prospectus 
The role development rights transfer will play as a land use and 
public financing technique in corning years is not easily assayed. Con­
ceptually, the device is in its infancy. It has not as yet received the 
imprimatur of the courts.82 Despi te the favorable conclusions of a 
feasibility study addressing its use for landmark preservation83 and 
80. For a p rojection of the urban design consequences of density transfers within 
high-density commercial and residential zones, see SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 33, at ch. 5. 
81.  See note 79 supra. 
82. Court challenges involving two New York City development rights transfer pro- · 
grams may soon shed some light on judicial attitudes toward the technique. In the 
first action the Penn Central Company, as owner of Grand Central Station, a desig­
nated landmark, has attacked the constitu tionality of the New York City Landmarks 
program ,  which includes provisions expressly tailored to relieve economic pressures 
threatening the landmark by permitting the transfer of its unused development rights to 
nearby lots. See NEW YORK, N.Y. ZONING RESOLUTION art. VII, ch. 4 ,  §§ 74-79, 74-791 
to -793 (1971) .  An account of the litigation may be found in UsE OF LAND, supra note 2, 
at 150-52. An action has also been commenced challenging the constitu tionality of a 
second measure, N EW YORK, N.Y. ZONING RESOLUTION . art. IX, ch. 3, §§ 93-00, 93-01 to 
-075 (1 972), which offsets the prohibition o f  development of Manhattan's Tudor Parks 
by permitting the transfer of their development rights to other lots within a "Special 
Park District." The measure is further described in Elliott 8c Marcus, supra note 34, 
at 76-78. 
83. See note 55 supra. 
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some conspicuous successes in a variety of limited contexts,84 it  cannot 
lay claim to extensive testing in the marketplace. A variety of stubborn 
Plannincr and economic questions remai n  unresolved. Despite these 0 . 
uncertainties it may not be premature to catalogue the maJor ad-
vantages of development rights transfer. 
I .  Constitutional and Political A dvantages 
Development rights transfer promises resource protection without 
calling either for drastic inroads upon settled constitutional principles 
or for public programs that are politically unfeasible. For constitu­
tional purposes landowners with actionable interests include owners 
of the protected resource and property owners within transfer dis· 
tricts. Resource owners will be duly compensated for the curtailment 
of their development prerogatives under the program. The eco­
nomic return of landowners within transfer districts may be re­
duced, of course, but the magnitude o f  the reduction will not be 
greater than, and typically will fall far short of, that which courts 
have routinely sustained under the police power since the Euclid 
decision. 85 
84. Applications or pending uses of the technique include the following: preserva­
tion of the Old Locust Grove Farmhouse in suburban Montgomery County, Md., see 
SPACE ADRIFT, suj1ra note 33, at 43; preservation of the Heurich Mansion, a Wash­
ington, D.C., landmark, id. at 41 ;  preservation of Amster Yard, Manhattan, see Hux table, 
City Laudmark Gets a Chance for Survival, N .Y. Times, Aug. 2. 1970, § 8, at 1 ,  col. 
l ;  preservation and refurbishing of historic buildings in Manhattan's Special South 
Street Seaport District, see Horsley, Air Rights Deal Saves South St. Seaport, N .Y. 
Times, July 30, 1973, at 3 1 ,  col. 3; proteccion of agricultural land in Suffolk County, 
New York, see SOUTHAMPTON, N.Y. ZONING ORD. No. 26, § 2-4-30 (1972), discussed in 
Chavooshian & Norman, Transfer of Development Rights: A New Concept in Land 
Management 7 (Rutgers University n.d.). State legislatures have also begun to show an 
interest in the technique. In 197 1 ,  for example, the Illinois legislature approved an 
extensive revision of that state's preservation enabling act prepared by the author to 
permit the use of development rights transfer in aid of historic preservation. See Ill. 
Pub. A. No. 77-1372 (Ill. Leg. Serv., Aug. 3 1 ,  1971),  in part codified at ILL. REV. STAT. 
ch. 24, § 1 1 -48.2-lA, in part amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § l l -48 .2 -2 -6 ( 1 969). In 
Janua�y 1972, Senator William J.  Goodman introduced a bill (Senate Bill No. 252, 
1972) m the Maryland Senate authorizing local governments to create transfer districts 
in  which devel?pment rights could .be sold. See Rose, From the Legislatures, 1 REAL ESTATE L.J. 276
. 
(1973). � transfer bill has also been prepared for introduction in the 
New Jersey leg1sl�ture m 1973 that would employ the technique to preserve New 
Jersey s prime. agricultural land. Letter from B. Chavooshian, Land Use Specialist and Program Advisor for Resource Management, Rutgers University, to the author, July 
16, 1973. 
Fe�eral interest in the transfer concept has been u nderscored by Secretary of the 
Inteno.r Rogers C.B. Mortoi:i who has proposed a demonstration program under which 12 Chicago Sch?.ol �f Architecture land!!1arks wo�l? be brot�g?t under the protective umbrella .of a Nauon�l Cultural Park to be JOmtly administered by the National Park Service and the city. In return for enactment of the Chicago Plan, p .  86 supra, �hicago would receive the federal financial assistance necessary to seed the development 
nghts bank and to cover related costs in the administration of the Park. See SPACE 
ADRIFT, supra note 33, a t  62; Huxtable, A Plan for Chicago, N.Y. Times, April 15, 
1973, § 2, at 23, col. 3. 
85. See p. 108 infra. 
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Adding compensation as a sweetener to the transfer package does 
not guarantee that the proposed resource protection programs will 
escape political opposition. Until quite recently, in fact, it may have 
intensified resistance because it immunizes from constitutional at­
tack measures that severely dilute private control over the use of 
land. Increasingly, however, the public outcry against environmental 
despoliation as a result of land development is being forcefully 
brought to the attention of courts and legislatures, which in turn 
react by decreeing or enacting alternativess6 that the real estate com­
munity will consider more onerous than transfer programs. 
The portents for the economic feasibility of thoughtfully con­
ceived transfer programs are favorable. Simulated application of the 
Chicago Plan under the economic conditions prevailing in the Chi­
cago real estate market in 1971 ,  for example, produced auspicious 
results.s7 Favorable response to other forms of incentive zoning, such 
as zoning bonuses and cluster and PUD zoning, is also encouraging.ss 
At a minimum that response demonstrates the capacity of investors 
in land development to adapt to a variety of developmental ground 
rules through the pricing mechanism and other means, provided that 
the rules are clearly spelled out in  advance and are evenhandedly 
adm.inistered . Nevertheless, existing voi.ds in land economics research 
and in market experience caution against facile conclusions respecting 
the transfer technique's economic impact on resource owners and 
landowners within transfer districts. 
2. Recoupment of Governmentally Created Values zn Private 
Devel,ppment rights transfer promises to redress the most grievous 
consequenc.e of the American property system's .. bias i n  favor of pri­
vate property rights: government's failure to recoup for public use 
an appropriate measure of the values that it creates in  privately held 
86. These include the public trust doctrine, resurrected principles o f  venerable origin 
affirming public rights in riparian lands, population and building height limitation 
referenda, 60-acre lot size minima, environmental impact statement requirements, build­
ing permit moratoria, and governmental refusals to extend public services. See TAKING, 
supra note 10, a t  3-50; UsE or LAND, supra note 2, at 33-73. Developers increasingly 
must also contend with citizen-sponsored comprehensive plans, sophisticated conservation 
organizations armed with batreries of attorneys spoiling for a fight, and recurring 
media portrayals of developers as flinty-eyed bad guys thirsting for the almighty buck. 
By permitting the transfer of development from ecologically-sensitive areas to locations 
that are environmentally unobjectionable, the transfer technique offers developers a 
strategy which assures them a fair return o n  their investment while minimizing en­
vironmentally-based opposition to their development programs. 
87. See SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 33, at chs. 3, 4. 
88. See NEW ZONING, supra note 27; W. WHYTE, supra note 61; Chicago Plan, supra 
note 52, a t  575-77. 
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Iand.s9 This failure runs through virtually all  of the system's tra­
ditional recoupment mechanisms, including real estate taxation,90 
special assessment,91 diminution of eminent domain ai.vards through 
the doctrine of special benefits, 92 and recapture of the cost of public 
programs through resale of interests acquired by the government.93 
I t  has also undoubtedly contributed to the lack of experimentation 
in the United States with public land banking programs.94 Com­
mentators of a variety of persuasions wi th respect to economic in-
89. For an original discussion of possible methods of recoupment other than de· 
velopment rights transfer, see Wexler, supra_ not� . 42, at 
20
_
6- 1 3. . . . 
90. Assaults upon the real estate tax as 111cfhc1ent and mequ1tabl� an? endemic _ 111 
public finance literature. See, e.g., H. GROVES, FINAi\CING GovERNMEi\T b9 ((;th e<l. 1 %·1); 
Rawson, Property Taxation and Urban Development: Effects of the l'rope�·ty Tax _on 
City Growth and Change IO (Urban Land Institute Research Monograph .No. 4, 1 9h ! J ;  
Browning, Land Value Taxation: Promises a n d  Pro blem.s, 2 9  J .  A M .  IMT. l'LA\":'(J:.RS 
301 ,  302 ( 1963). . . . 
. 
91 .  In principle, a special a_ssessment_ 
frnanccs publ�c .1mprov�ments by re
turnmg; to 
government amounts equal to mcreases m value accruing to pnvate property benelHcd 
by the improvements. See authorities cited note 1 39 i11/ra. In practice, government i s  
usually shortchanged. Restrictive administration or judicial in terpretation of the haiy 
distinction between "general" and "'special" benefits (increases in value resulting from 
the former not being assessable against the benefited parcel, see notes 1 39-42 infra) ex­
cludes from consideration land values originating with the improvement. T he same 
result obtains when, as frequently occurs, specially benefited land is cxcl ude<l from an 
improvement district. Even when a parcel is conceded to be subject to assessment, more· 
over, appraisal procedures often do not fully credit government's contribu lion LO its 
value or do so on a regressive basis. Windfalls may be enjoyed by private owners i( 
the increase in value exceeds the cost of the improvement. .Finally, special assessment 
legislation typically mandates that only a fraction of the cost of an improvement may 
be recovered through assessments, leaving the remainder to be returned through gen­
eral tax revenues. See Spengler, The Increment Tax versus Special Assessments (pls. 
1 -3), 20 BULL. NAT'L TAX Ass'N 258 (1935), 21 BULL . NAT'L TAX Ass'i\ 14, 240 (1936); 
Wexler, supra note 42, at 1 96-98. 
92. This doctrine is founded on the view that the amount government 11111st pay 
when it condemns less than a landowner's entire parcel should be diminished by any 
appreciation in the value of the remainder attributable to the public improvement.  
See 3 P.  N1c:HOLS, THE LAW OF E"'IINENT DOMAIN § 8 .6206 (3d rev. ed. 1965). Sl'.c 
generally Haar & Hering, Determination of Benefits in Land Acq uisition. 51 CALIF. 
L. REV. 833 (1963). But its effectiveness has been blunted in two regards . .First, judicial 
confusion att�1�ding the disti�ction between "general" and "special" benefils has 
eroded the effJCJency of the device as a recoupment mechanism. See id. at 868-69. Second, 
many jurisdictions do not permit concede� special benefit
.
s to be offset against the 
award for the parcel taken, set-off only being allowed agarnst damages to the parcel 
not taken. See id. at 879. Should these benefits exceed the latter of course Lhey 
provide a windfall for the property owners. 
' ' 
93. Responding to the nation's deep-seated laissez faire traditions, the courts have 
�ealt uneasily wi.�h public pr�grams in which _ governm_ent jntervenes, as entreprenelll', m a formerly puvate economic sphere. Such m tervent10n 1s patent when, to finance 
the programs, government •  resells or leases the interest that it has condemned, as in 
th� case of urban renewal, trade center, navigation, and other capital projects durin" 
this cen �ury. For an account of the grudging j udicial stance toward the recoupmcn� 
feature . m some of these progr_ams as well as the legal pitfalls that confront others, see Ch icago Plan, supra note a2, at 605 - 1 1 .  See generally R. Cus11�1AN, EXCESS Co:-;­
DEM NATION (1917); Hodgman, A ir Rights and Public Finance: Public Use in a New 
Guise, 42 S. CAL. L. REV. 625 (1969). 
94. For the impressive support that has existed among American land use com­
mentators on behalf of land banking, see authorities collected in ALI MODEL LAND 
DEVELOPMENT CODE, SrECIA1: NOTE ON_ 
LAND
_ 
BANKING 50 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1 973). But  
se� S.  Kamm, Land Banking: Public Pohcy Alternatives and Dilemmas (Urban In·  
sutute Paper No. 1 12-28, 19iO). 
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stitutions have despaired of government's laxity in i ts recoupment 
practices.9� 
By regarding the development potential of private property as in 
part a community resource, on the other hand, development rights 
transfer enables government to share in the gains occasioned by rising 
land values. Eminent domain awards paid to owners of protected re­
sources will be discounted to eliminate windfalls attributable to gov­
ernmental rather than private initiative. Marginal downward revi­
sions in the development potential  o f  lands within transfer districts 
will afford the funds required by these awards; these revisions will 
be proportioned to what land economists have long regarded as the 
"unearned increment" in the value of private property.96 
Development rights transfer, in short, looks squarely to the land 
development process itself for revenues to protect the community from 
the unfortunate consequences tha t  may fairly be attributed to that 
process. Rather than advocating a n  indiscriminate assault  on the com­
pensation principle, it apportions the burdens and benefits of land 
development on the basis of a coherent, socially defensible policy. 
3. Resolution of the Windfall/ Wipe-out Dilemma 
The random impact of land use regulations within the private 
sector is another source of grave imbalance in the nation's property 
sysi:em. As the trend toward the adoption of stringen t  resource pro­
tection programs increases, windfalls and wipe-outs97 threaten to be­
come endemic. To avoid this unfortunate result a balancing mecha­
nism should be built into these programs that cancels out the un­
justified gains and losses in the private sector. Under development 
rights transfer programs owners o f  restricted resources are not wiped 
out, but are duly compensated, and the windfall of increased land 
values that property owners within transfer districts might other-
95. See, e.g., J. COM MONS, INSTITUTI01'AL ECONOM ICS 81 1 - 1 8  ( 1 934); H .  GROVES, Fl­
:'iANCJ:w; GOVER;\; M t:NT 96, 357 (liih ed. 1964) ; E. SELIGMAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATION 83, 491-539 
(10th ed. 1 925); Haar, The Social Control of Urban space, in Cnms AND SPACE 2 1 8  
(L. Wingo ed. 1 963); Wicksell, A New PrincijJle of just Taxation, in CLASSICS IN m i;  
T11rnRY O F  PUBLIC .FINANCE 1 1 2-15 (R.  Musgrave & A. Peacock eds. 1 968); Eliot, A 
l'rogressitie Tax ori /Jare La11d Values, 4 CITY !'LANNI:-;<; 83 ( 1 928); Spengler, Tile 
T11xat io11 of Land l'alue /llrre111e11 ts, 1 7  J. LA:o>D & l'UR. Urn.rrY ECONOM ICS 54-58 (194 1 ) ;  
Wex ler, .m/Jl'a note 42, at 200-06; cf. l'.. BARKLEY &: D. SECKLER, sufna note 1 3 , at 179. 
This lacuna i n the nation's property phi losophy accounts for the paradox that, after 
creat ing land values, the government is often stymied by them when it seeks to regulate 
pri1·atc land use decisions in the public i n terest. See pp. 90-92 su/>ra. Thus, " [s]pecu· 
lat<ns arc subsidized by our system of public improvemen ts for private profit." 1 8  
HousE AND H o M E ,  Aug. 1 960, a t  144. 
96. See authori ties cited note 95 supra. 
9i. See p. 83 & note 4 1  supra. 
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wise enjoy in consequence of these restrictions is offset by the pay­
ments they must make for additional development rig·hts. 
4. Closing the Externalities Loop 
A negative externality is defined by economists as a cost of a par­
ticular enterprise that is not borne by the en trepreneur but is shifted 
to the community.98 With the imperfect public understanding of en­
vironmental problems that preceded pu b lication of Rachel Carson's 
Silent Spring and other influential works of ecological scientists, the 
externalities of land development were poorly grasped both popularly 
and in the law. The variety and geographic ex ten t of environmental 
damage caused by land development was not recognized. Piecemeal 
perception of both factors explains in part the misconceived bifur­
cation of development posited by the harm/benefit rationale. 
An important consequence of this recently acquired knowledge is 
a greater awareness of the negative externalities that attend all forms 
of land development.99 Indeed, some commentators have identified 
as the "underlying cause" of the environmental dilemma "an absence 
of rules which make i t  worthwhile for perpetra tors . . .  to count as 
their own costs the costs they impose on others. " 100 
One function of law is to return the cost of an ex ternality to 
its creator when the harm is deemed sufficiently grave i n  its societal 
impact. In part, recent decisions,101 which in their quest for environ­
mental quality have put in issue the continued vigor of the compen­
sation requirement, are motivated by this objective. The same goal 
animates development rights transfer, which "closes the externalities 
�oop" by charging the land development process with costs that for­
merly, and improperly, fell upon the community in the form of 
environmental depredation-or of expensive remedial programs to 
overcome it. 
98. See P. BARKLEY &: D. SECK LER, supra note 13 ,  at 98-122. See generally K. KAPP, 
THE SOCIAL COSTS OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE (1950); Coase, The Problem of Socia l Cost, 
3 J. LAW &: EcoN. I (1960) . 
. 99_ An �ppreciation _of the itni;>act of discrete development decisions upon the en­
vironment IS _app�rent m the env1r�mmental �mpact statement requirements of federal and state legislation. See, e-g., National Envuonmental Policy Act, 92 U.S.C . § 4332 
(1970); CAL. PUB. REs. CooE § 2 1 100 (Wes� .supp- 1973). By insisting that the con­seque�ces of .Proposed development be scr.utm1zed from a broad space-time perspective 
and m relation . t? less har�ful alternat1v�s, this requirement conflicts directly with the crude, atom1suc perception of the environment that has shaped so much of the 
Anglo-American s_ys�em of prop�rty law. See generally UsE OF L.A,ND, supra note 2, at 195:208 (d�scnbmg the r_equ�rement as the " [b] est [m]echanism [s]o [f]ar" for protecting environmental quahty, id. at 195). 
100. p. BARKLEY &: D. SECKLER, supra note 13,  at 100. 
1 0 1 .  See note 10 supra. 
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5. Universality of Application 
Development rights transfer is an extraordinarily flexible tool for 
resource protection which can be adapted to protect virtually any 
low density resource endangered by market forces that press for higher 
densities. Whether it will be economically feasible in any given con­
text depends principally upon two factors : market demand for new 
construction within the transfer district and zoning controls that 
limit the residual density to levels that fall short of these demands.102 
The first can be anticipated whenever low density resources are im­
periled by market forces because it is these forces that have placed 
the resources in peril; moreover, healthy construction markets which 
can serve as sales areas for the transferred density can presumably be 
found elsewhere within the jurisdiction where the resource is located. 
The second factor depends solely upon action by the pertinent legis­
lative authority, assuming that the a llocation of private development 
potential in the interest of resou rce protection is a proper exercise 
of governmental power. 
6. Improved Physical Planning 
Development rights transfer can also serve as a catalyst to im­
proved land use planning. The Georgetown proposal, for example, 
demonstrates how cities can employ transfers to encourage more ef­
ficient transit system use.103 In a regional context transfers can func­
tion to channel population to predetermined locations, such as those 
at the metropolitan fringe where extensive capital improvement pro­
grams are proposed or underway. But the most attractive of these 
subsidiary advantages is the impetus that transfers provide for more 
thoughtful, comprehensive land use planning by the city, region or 
state. Transfers should not occur within a planning vacuum if frus­
tration of other planning goals of equal or greater priority than 
resource protection is to be avoided. Thus, built into the Chicago 
Plan and the Puerto Rico proposal are extensive planning inquiries: 
inventories of the number, location, and character of the pertinent 
low density resource, selection a s  transfer districts of areas in which 
additional or redistributed density can be efficiently absorbed, and 
identification of zoning trade-offs, such as reduced lot size, extra floor 
area, or tower coverage, that wil l  be allotted to development rights 
purchasers. 
102. For a detailed evaluation of the economic variables affecting the marketability 
of development rights, see SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 33, at ch. 4. 
103. See p. 90 supra. Other subsidiary planning advantages of the · transfer tech­
nique are recounted in SPACE ADRIFT 50, 1 36. 
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7.  Improved Economic Planning 
Development rights transfer would also respond to the economic 
questions often left unanswered by restrictive land use programs. In  
state sensitive area acts, for example, C assandra-l ike prefaces warn­
ing of impending environmental doom and operative clauses cal l ing 
for the designation of loosely defined sensitive areas are found cheek 
by jowl with blunt injunctions against uncompens�ted takings. 1 0 1  
They fail to offer concrete guidance a s  to  the cost of these resource 
programs, the source of payments, and the reach of the ban against 
uncompensated takings.1os 
Legislative silence perpetuates the imbalances in the American 
property system and virtually guarantees that stringent resource pro­
tection programs will be fought by influential private interests whose 
support or acquiescence is vital to the success of many of these pro· 
grams. Further, the buck is improperly passed to the courts, which 
are ill-suited to deal knowledgeably with the complex economic issues 
that review of these programs necessarily enta i ls. Hence, an even 
greater disarray among judicial approaches to the taking issue can be 
anticipated than that which pervades the pre- 1 970 decisions.106 
While transfer programs of the type suggested in this article cer­
tainly do not provide all the answers, they at least ask the right 
questions. Reasonable estimates of the cost, for example, of preserving 
Puerto Rico's ecologically fragile areas or Chicago's landmarks107 can 
be derived from an inventory of their n umber and type and from 
projections of the costs attenaing the acquisition of their development 
rights. The extent to which these costs can be offset by density trans­
fers can be gauged by market studies fixing the probable value of 
development rights within proposed transfer districts . 1 os With this 
data the jurisdiction can make realistic judgments of what it can af­
ford and of the relative costs and benefits of alternative priorities 
104. See, e.g., Maryland Wetlands Act, MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 725 (Supp. 1 972); 
Virginia Wetlands Act, yA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.l-1 3.6- 1 3. 1 31\2(a) (Supp. 1973). 
105. A notable excepllon to the observation in text has occurred in Florida where 
citizens in 1972 approved a bond issue for $240 million for the purchase of en­
vironmentally endangered lands. See UsE oF LAND, supra note 2, at 65-66. 
106. See, e.g., Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years 
of Expropriation Law, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 63, 105; Kusler, supra note 3, at 3 n.4; 
Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by the Police Power: The Search for Inverse 
Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. l ,  1 4  (1971) .  
1 07.  For a detailed simulation of these procedures as  applied to the preservation 
of four Chicago School of Architecture landmarks, see SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 33, 
at ch. 3. 
1 �8. For an exp�sition of the relevant appraisal techniques and an illustration of 
their use . to determine market demand for development rights within Chicago's Loop 
area, see id. at ch. 4. 
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among its land use goals. These judgments should assist it in for­
mulating resource programs that both allay the justified concerns of 
affected property owners and enable the courts to fashion norms that 
furnish security of transactions for those engaged in commerce in land. 
II. Development Rights Transfer: A Legal Rationale 
To the traditionalist zoning is a design, not a fiscal, tool. Used in 
conjunction with development rig·hts transfer, on . the other hand, 
it is both. Around this hybrid use of zoning cluster the legally con­
troversial features of the technique. Disgruntled owners in transfer 
districts can be expected to insist that government may fix density 
levels only on the basis of substantive planning criteria-those re­
lating to adequate light, air, pedestrian access, and similar factors . 
But transfer programs regulate density for the additional purpose 
of creating a market for development rights. Hence, these owners 
will conclude, the programs must fall as improper encroachments 
upon private property rights. 
This objection may take various forms. It may be contended that 
raising funds for environmental betterment lies within  the province 
of the taxing rather than the police power. Transfer programs' cost­
shifting and residual density features may be challenged on taking 
grounds. Contentions that transfer programs are exclusionary and 
improperly discriminate against landowners within transfer districts 
may give rise to equal protection attacks. 
Two statutory challenges arising under pertinent state zoning· en­
abling acts can be anticipated as well.  First, it may be insisted that 
these acts do not authorize communities to employ zoning in aid 
of the broader environmental and amenity goals that transfer pro­
grams ,�ddress. Second, the programs' dual bulk system may be said 
to violate the dictate i_n most of these acts that "[a ]11 [zoning] regu­
lations shall be uniform for each class or kind of buildings through­
out eac11 district."109 
Though formidable, these objections can be overcome by securing 
judicial approval of the principle that the development  potential of 
private property is in part a community asset and by modifying ap­
plicable land use legislation to permit the implementation of this 
principle in the context of specific transfer programs. This section 
109. ADVISORY COMM ITTEE ON ZONING, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING 
ENABLING ACT UNDER WHICH MUNICIPALITIES MAY ADOPT ZONING REGULATIONS § 2 
(rev. ed. 1 926). 
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addresses the first of these concerns by offering a legal rationale for 
development rights transfer, but leaves the specific content of re­
quired amendments to lawmakers in each jurisdiction. !h� discussion 
do.es, however, identify areas where statutory change is hkely to be 
advisable. 
A. Development Rights Transfer as a Regulatory /Fiscal Hybrid 
Zoning is grounded in the state's police power. Is it then necessarily 
impermissible to build into a zoning measure provisions intended to 
raise funds for resource protection? Putting the question of statutory 
authority to one side for the moment, the answer ought surely to 
be no. The difference between the police and taxing powers is hardly 
clearcut and may be so slim in specific instances as to be unrecog­
nizable.110 Courts have long considered i t  neither surprising nor ob-
l lO. From a functional perspective the premise that the two powers mt!st be rigidly 
compartmentalized is dubious. For years public finance scholars have rejected 1t oi:t 
of hand. See, e.g., J. COMMONS, supra note 95, at 820; E. SELICMA�, supra note 9:>, 
a t  402-06. Professor Commons, for example, has written that 
the. police power is none other than the sovereign power to restrain or suppress 
what is deemed, by the dominant interests, to be disadvantageous, and to promote 
and foster what they deem advantageous for the commonwealth. Taxation, then, 
is the most pervasive and privileged exercise of the police power . . . .  Even when 
not consciously intended to be regulative, taxes nevertheless regulate, for they, 
like the protective tariffs, determine the directions in which people may become 
wealthy by determining directions in which they may not become wealthy 
It is impossible to avoid these effects of taxes, therefore impossible to escape the 
police power of taxation, therefore impossible to look upon taxes of any kind 
whatever as merely a means of obtaining revenue . . . . Taxation is, in fact, a 
process of obtaining public revenue by proportioning inducement to obtain profits. 
J. COMMONS, supra at 820. 
Professor Seligman makes the same point in his query: "Shall we call the Indian 
duty on opium a tax and refuse the same name to the American internal revenue 
charge, because India looks primarily to revenue, and the Uni ted States to regulation?" 
E. SELIGMAN, supra at 403. 
Legal scholars too have recognized the ephemerality of the distinction, functionally 
considered. De�pite his �u thorship of the revenue/regulatory test, for examp�, Cooley 
concedes that m many mstances custom alone determines whether a measure will be 
characterized as a tax or as a police power enactment. 4 T. COOLEY, THE LA w OF T AXA noN 
§ 1 784, at 35 14 (4th ed. 1 924) [hereinafter cited as CooLEY] .  Further, modern land 
use commentators have ar�ued that th� taxing and police powers may be used inter· 
c hangeably as .the foundat10n for planmng techniques such as the subdivision exaction. See n�te 205 mfr�. Especially noteworthy in this regard is the concl usion of Heyman 
and G1lhool that [rl eg<1;rdless of labe�, properly constitu ted exactions for a wide variety 
of purposes �re constllutionally pe�m1ss1ble." Heyman and Gilhool, The Constitutionali­
ty. ?f. Imposing_ Increased Community Costs on New Suburban Residents through Sub­div1s1�n Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1 1 19, l l 55 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Subdivision 
Exactions] . 
For support of this conclusion, compare Associated Home Builders of the Greater 
East Bay •
. 
In�. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal: ?d 633, 484 P .2? 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, appe0;l d1sm1ssed, �04 U.S. 878 (1971) (sustammg forced dedication or substitu te fee 
exaction as a pohce power measure), with Associated Homebuilders of the Greater 
E�st. Bay, Inc. v. City of Newark, 18 Cal . App. 3d 1 07, 95 Cal. Rptr. 648 ( 1971)  (sus­tammg a l.evy keyed to the number of bedrooms in dwellings as a license tax on the occupat10n of constructing buildings). 
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jectionable that police power measures are often accompanied by dis­
tinct fiscal effects-including direct i mposition of fees11 1�just as tax­
ing measures are frequently attended by unmistakable regulatory 
results.112 
But the inquiry does not end with the conclusion that transfer pro­
grams are u nobjectionable simply because they combine regulatory 
and fiscal elements. That conclusion establishes only that state legis­
latures may a u thorize local governments to enact these programs un­
der the police power. To avoid ensnarement in the ultra vires trap 
local governments must be prepared to demonstrate that legislatures 
have done so. A sound enabling act113 will assist them in showing, 
first, that there is a statutory predicate for the local ordinance; second, 
that the ordinance is a police power rather than a taxing measure; 
and third, that the ordinance comports with the requirements of 
police power doctrine. 
The significance of the first of these showings lies, of course, in 
the status of local governments a s  creatures of the state possessing 
only those powers accorded them b y  the state.114 More complicated 
is the need for the second-convincing the court that a transfer pro­
gram is a police power, not a taxing . measure. Taxing enactments 
must pass muster under a gamut of state constitutional and statutory 
. 
constraints which, depending upon the type of tax involved, may 
include uniformity, w; ad valorem imposition,11 6 and tax rate limi­
tations.117 If deemed taxing measures, transfer programs will almost 
ll I. See, e.g., Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of 
Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 ( 1 97 1) (subdivision 
exaction legislation requiring payment of a fee in lieu of land dedication under pre­
scribed conditions); Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Environmental Improvement Comm'n, 
307 A.2d 1 (Me. 1 973) (license for clean-up of oil spills in state waters) (semble); 
Garden State Racing Ass'n v. Cherry Hill Twp., 42 N.J. 454, 201 A.2d 554 (1964) (license 
fee, receipts from which were used to regulate increased traffic and parking caused 
by racetrack activities); Sproul v. Oregon, 234 Ore. 579, 383 P.2d 754 ( 1963) (levy on 
forest lands for fire suppression purposes) . 
112. See illust,rations cited in H. GROVES, supra note 95, at 42-44; E. SELIGMAN, supra 
note 95, at 402-06. 
1 13. In order to probe the legal issues posed by defective enabling legislation, dis­
cussion in the remainder of the text assumes that local governments rather than state 
or. regional age�cies will administer development rights transfer programs. As the Puerto Rico proposal illustrates, however, these programs may be implemented at any level 
of government depending upon the goals which the particular program is designed 
to achieve. See SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 33, a t  1 76. 
l l4. See cases and authorities cited in S. SATO & A. VAN ALSTYNE, STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT LAW 85-95 (�970). 
l l5. See � COOLEY, supra note l lO, at § 260; 1 6  McQUILLIN� MUNICIPAL CORPORA­
TIONS, Taxation § ·44.19 (1972 rev. vol.). 
ll6. See I CooLEY, mpra note 1 1 0, at §§ 127, 153; 16 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL COR­
PORATIONS, Taxation § 44.17a (1972 rev. vol.). 
l l7. See 16 M cQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, Taxation § 44.25 (1972 rev. vol.). 
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certainly run afoul of one or more of these constraints, 1 1 8  u n less 
their structure is substantially modified. 1 19 
An express statutory declaration that development rights transfer 
is a police power technique will be helpful, though not conclusive. 
The court can be expected to make an independent appraisa J , 1 c" 
utilizing Judge Cooley's classic litmus for distinguishing police pcmcr 
from taxing measures-namely, whether development rights tra nsfer's  
primary goal is_ "regulatory" or "fiscal" in nature.1:! 1  Despi te the  
test's vagueness, there seems little reason to doubt that t h e  technique 
will be labeled regula tory if the court otherwise finds it proper. The 
purpose of transfer programs, after all ,  is identical with that o(  con­
ventional land use endeavors: channeling private development deci­
sions toward results that comport with the jurisdiction's physical 
planning objectives. 
A contrary conclu s ion would require that the court wrench the 
income-generating component of the transfer program from its over­
all regulatory setting. Courts have refused to isolate the fiscal ele­
ment in their evaluation of other hybrid forms of development 
control. Thus, communities may zone to encourage industry and 
other lucrative sources of tax revenue to settle within their bound­
aries.122 They may also impose dual bulk systems in conj unction ·with 
cluster and PUD zoning ordinances that offer the developer a trade 
of increased density for dedication of a prescribed percentage of his 
land to community use.123 Withou t any trade they may secure the 
same result through subdivision ordinances that mandate dedication 
or monetary payments as a condition to subdivision plat approvaJ .1'>1  
The courts have approved these measures despite their conceded 
fiscal elements and, as to the latter two, despite the fact that acqui­
sition of private land for public use has traditionally been financed 
through the taxing power. 
l l8. If restrictions on densities within transfer districts we1e held equi\ alent to a 
real estate tax on lands located there, for example, the program would be im alidatcd 
because the " tax" would meet neither the uniformity nor ad valorem imposition 
requirements. 
1 19. See pp. 125-26 infra. 
120. See note 1 1 1  supra. 
121.  See 4 COOLEY, supra note l lO, at § I 784. On the distinction between measures 
founded on the police power and those ba�e? on t_he power of taxation, see generally 9 McqmLLIN, MUNICIPAL Co�PORATIONS, Mu!1�c1pal �tc�nses and Permits § 26. I G  ( 1 964 rc1 . 
vol.), Note, � 
_
Re-Ev�luation of the Judicial Criteria for Detern1111111g lite R easona/Jle­
ness of Mumczpal License Fees, l l  RUTGERS L. REV. 702 ( 1957); N o te, Police p01ar 
Taxation, 4 WILLAMETTE L.J.  532 (1967). 
122. See Gruber v. Raritan Twp., 39 N .J.  l ,  1 86 A.2d 489 (1962). See generally D. 
HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW § 5 1  ( 197 1 )  [hcn:-
inafter cited as URBAN PLAN NING] . 
' 
123. See cases cited notes 189-90 infra. 
124. See note 137 infra. 
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These decisions reflect the judiciary's unwillingness to block in­
novative land use programs by invoking precious conceptual dis­
tinctions between the police and taxing powers. They are pragmatic 
in tone, disap pointingly so fo those who would prefer more thoug·ht­
ful treatment of the differences between the two powers. Yet they 
anticipate remarkably well the growing recognition among influ­
ential scholars125 and study commissions126 that solution of the na­
tion's grave land use problems must start with the premise that 
physical planning and economic planning are, at base, two sides 
of the same coin. 
The third showing-compliance of the enabling act and the im­
plementing ordinance with police power doctrine-should prove the 
least troublesome. Under police power doctrine, the burdened class 
must be shown to be the class whose actions have created the evil 
that the !egisl.ation is intended to remedy127 and revenues raised 
from the police power imposition must be devoted exclusively to 
the public objectives that motivated their adoption.1 28 The nexus 
between , development and environmental harm should fulfill the 
first requirement, especially if its existence appears as an express 
legislative finding in · the enabling act's preface. And restricting the 
use of development rights sales funds solely for the environmental ob­
jectives of the particular transfer program can be achieved simply 
by writing the pertinent limitations into both the enabling act and 
the ordinance.  
B.  Development Rights Transfer and Due Process 
l.  The Confiscation Objection 
Whether the residual densities prescribed for transfer districts will 
trigger a successful taking challenge to transfer programs depends 
upon the magnitude of the reduction in economic return that courts 
125. See, e.g., Rawson, Property Taxation and Urban Development: Effects of 
the Property Tax on City Growth and Change 7-8 (Urban Land Institu te, Research 
Monograph No. 4, 1961); Browning, Land Value Taxation: Promises and Problems, 29 
J. AM . INST. PLANNERS 301 , 307 ( 1963); Hagman, The Single Tax and Land Use Planning: 
Henry George Updated, 1 2  UCLA L. REv. 762, 782-88 (1965). 
126. See UsE OF LAND, supra note 2, a t  19-22, 27-29, 103·43, 2 1 9-61 .  See generally 
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON URBAN HOUSING: A DECENT HOME ( 1 968); NATIONAL 
COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS: BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, H.R. Doc. No. 34, 
9lst Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). 
127. See, e.g., I COOLEY, supra note l lO, a t  � 268; E. FREUND, supra note 4, at 635. 
128. Under settled police power doctrine, a logical connection must exist between 
the object sought to be accomplished by a regulatory ordinance and the means pre­
scribed for this end. Clearly, applying revenue raised in conjunction with a regulatory 
scheme to some pu rpose unrelated to that scheme would violate this requirement. 
Cf. Kelber v. City of Upland, 155 Cal. App . 2d 631,  318 P.2d 561 ( 1957). 
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will ,deem nonconfiscatory and the severity of the particular pro­
gram's restrictions. Neither variable should prove the undoing of a 
carefully formulated transfer program. 
Recent cases, 129 some assert, support the view that, short of an 
actual appropriation by government, regulation of private land use 
for a public purpose can never constitute a taking. 130 This interpre­
tation is perilous for draftsmen of transfer legislation. Aside from 
its blatant unfairness as an across-the-board prescription, it may in 
retrospect be viewed as an overbroad reading of these cases, which 
represent the position of little more than a handful of state courts. 
Reliance upon it is unnecessary in any event because established 
zoning doctrine provides more than enough leeway to legitimate 
the density limitations that are likely to be required to guarantee 
a transfer program's economic feasibility. The Eu clid decision buried 
the claim that zoning measures are constitutionally infirm simply 
because they preclude landowners from devoting their property to 
its most profitable use. Instead, these measures are routinely sustained 
so long as they advance the community's general welfare and the 
property is susc.eptible to some reasonable, albeit less profitable, type 
or intensity of development.131 
That resource protection-the goal of transfer programs-advances 
community welfare cannot be seriously contested. But the reason­
ableness of the extent of development permitted under the residual 
densities prescribed for transfer districts cannot be assessed without 
reference to the second variable-the stringency of these densities un­
der the particular transfer program. This issue cannot be resolvtd 
in the abstract. Studies indicate, however, that restraints upon re­
sidual densities should fall well within the range sanctioned by es­
tablished zoning doctrine.132 Nor should it be assumed that transfer 
129. See note 10 supra. 
130. See TAKING, supra note 10, at 238; UsE OF LAND, supra note 2, at 175. 
131 . . � representati:ire �orr�ulation of this principle appears in an opinion written by a d1stmgmshed zonmg Jllnst: 
[P] roperty nee� i:iot be �oned to permit every .use to which it is adapted nor must 
all property s1m1larly s�tuated_ b� accorded identical treatment. To so require 
would frustra�e the zonmg: ob1ec_
t1ye of. a well-balan�ed community according to a comprehensive p�an .. It 1s suff1c1ent 1f the regulauons permit some reasonable 
use of the property m light of the statutory purpose. 
Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Parsipanny-Troy Hills Twp., 40 N.J. 539 557 
193 A.2d 232, 242 (1963) (Hall, J.). 
. ' ' 
. 132. See Department of City P�anning, San Francisco Downtown Zoning Study, Fmal Report (!966); Ruth, Economic Aspects of the San Francisco Zoning Ordinance 
Bon"!s Syste!'i, m N£w ZONING, supra note 27, at 159. The economic investigation sup­
P<?rtl�g zomng bonuse� offered to dev�lopers. withi_n the Manhattan Broadway Theater D1stnct w�o _agr�e to mclude theaters 111 thelf pro1ects is recounted in Weinstein, How New York s Zoning Was Changed to Induce the Construction of Legitimate Theaters 
in NEW ZONING, supra note 27, at 131 .  See note 55 supra. 
' 
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programs will be open-ended ventures, whether in terms of costs 
that communities will incur or restrictions that landowners within 
transfer districts will  experience under them. The community is free 
to expand or contract the scope of its resource protection goals, to 
supplement funds obtained from development rights sales with gen­
eral revenues, and to make other appropriate adjustments. In ad­
di tion, the constraints of practical politics, a concern for social equity, 
and the desire to avoid vulnerability to constitutional challenge should 
deter imprudent governmental use of the transfer device. 
2. The Cost-Shi/ ting Objection 
The contention that the cost of resource protection programs may 
not be internalized to the land development process cannot be dis­
missed by citing contrary precedents because none addresses the issue 
precisely as it arises in the transfer context. In analogous contexts 
courts have approved police power programs in which costs were 
shifted to those whose activities created the need for the programs.133 
Within the specific area of land use the subdivision exaction prec­
edents1H are the most pertinent. Despite significant differences be­
tween the subdivision exaction and transfer techniques, 135 these 
precedents offer a useful point of departure for predicting judicial 
response to transfer programs. For our purposes they can be divided 
roughly into two groups: decisions that evaluate subdivision exac­
tions (or substitute fees) under special assessment doctrine13a and 
133. See, e.g., Portland Pipe Linc Corp. v. En vironmental Improvement Cornm 'n, 
:mi :\.2d 1 (Mc. 1 973) (semble); Garden S t a te Racing Association v. Cherry Hill  Twp .. 
4'..! N.J. 4'i4, 20 1 A.2d 554 ( 1 964); Sproul v. Oregon, 234 Ore. 579, 383 P.2d 754 ( 1 963) ; 
Drinnen v. City of Knoxville , 212 Tenn. 270, 369 S.W.2d 562 ( 1 963). W i t h  respect to 
the amou n t  of the police power imposition, which is typically cast as a " l icense fee," 
Cooley observes: 
[ I )  t is proper and reasonable tu take i n to account not only the ex penses merely 
of direct regu lat ion , but  all the i11cidc11tal cu1ueq uences that may be likely to 
subject lite pu blic to cost iu co11seque11ce of t h e  busi11ess lice11sed.  /11 so111e cases 
the i11cide11tal co11scq111·11ce.1 are 111uch t h e  111ost i111J10rla11t, a11d, in deed, are what 
are f1ri11cipally /tad ill vi1:w wlirn tlte fee is decided 11J1ou • . . .  What is a rea­
sonable kc depends la rgely upon sound legislative dism.:tion, and i t  will  be pre· 
sumcd that the fee is reasonable i n  amou nt,  unless the con trary appears on the 
face of the law itself, or is csta hlishcd by proper evidence. 
·I Coou:r, supra note 1 IO,  § 1809, at 3555-56 (emphasis added). Sec ge11cra lly authorities 
cited su/ira note 1 2 1 .  
134. See, e.g., notes I %·3i infra. The relevant lega l literature i s  collected i n  Landau, 
Urban Conce11 tralim1 ancl l.a11d Exacti<ms for Recreatio11al Use: Some Co11.1 t i tutio11al 
Problems i11 A1amlatory Dedicalio11 Ordinances iii Iowa, 22 DRAKE L. REV. i i ,  78 n.45 
(19i2). 
1 :1:"1. See p. 1 1 5 &: note 1 68 iu/ra. 
1 31i. Su, e.g., Kclh<'r v. City of lipland, 1 55 Cal. :\pp. 2cl 63 1 .  3 1 8  l'.2d 'i6 1 ( 1 957) ; 
Pioneer Trust & Savings !lank '" Vil lage of Mount Prospect, 22 I l l .  2d 3i5, 1 76 N.E.2d 
i99 ( l !l6 1 ) ; G u lcst .-\ ssoc iates, Inc. v. Town of '.\:cw burg, 25 M isc. 2d 1004, 209 N.Y.S.2d 
i:!!J _( 1 960), aff'd, 1:; .\pp. Div. 2d 8 1 'i ,  22:i N .Y.S.2d 538 ( 1 962). overruled, .Jcnad, Inc. 
1. \'11lagc of Scarsdale, 18 :\ .Y.2d i8, 2 1 8  � .E.2<l 6i3, 2il N.Y.S.2d 955 (1 966); Haugen 
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the more recent decisions that emphasize their character as police 
power measures. 137 I n  the following section it is conceded that devel­
opment rights transfers, like subdivision exactions, probably do not 
comport with special assessment criteria,138 but it is argued that they 
do satisfy the less demanding requirements of the police power. 
a. Development Rights Transfers and the Special Assessment 
Special assessment doctrine justifies governmental impositions on 
the basis of the "special benefit" that assessed property receives from 
the public improvement financed by the special assessment.139 Be­
cause land values within the general area of the improvement often 
increase, the concept of special benefit is ostensibly confined by three 
criteria: spatial proximity of the improvement to the assessed prop­
erty; 140 inclusion of the specific improvement in the restricted cat­
egory of public facilities that may be so financed; 141 and propor­
tionality between the amount of the assessment and the provable 
benefits accruing to the assessed property .142 
v. Gleason, 226 Ore. 99, 359 P.2� 1 08 ( 1 961) .  See a lso Jenatl, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale , 
supra, 18 N.Y.2d at 86, 2 1 8  :N.E.2d at 67i, 271  N.Y.S.2d at 959 (Van Voohris, J . ,  
d issenting); Jordan v.  Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2tl 608, 623, 13i  :'-i ."·.2Ll 
442, 450 (1 965) (Hallows, J., d issenting) . Under these opinions the challenged suli· 
division exaction measures were deemed unauthorized by pertinent enabling legislation 
and, in Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, supra, pos· 
sibly u nconstitutional as well . Concluding that the measures do not comport with cri· 
teria derived from special assessment doctrine and u nwilling to sustain them on broader 
police power grounds, the opinions analogize the exactions to taxes, i.e., impositions 
for general governmental p urposes, which fail to satisfy one or more of the taxation 
requirements. See p. 105 supra. 
1 37. See, e.g., Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of 
Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P .2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr . 630 ( 197 1 ) ; Aunt  Hack Ridge 
Estates, Inc. v. Planning Comm'n, 160 Conn. 109, 273 A.2d 880 ( 19i0); Jenad , Inc. 
v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 2 7 1  N .Y.S.2d 955 ( 1 966); Jordan 
v. Village ?f Men'?monee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 1 37 N.W.2d 442 ( 1965). 
138. This quest10n has been vigorously debated in the literature. for the view that 
subdivision exa�tio!'ls should be evaluated only under special assessment theory and 
that forced dedication of school or park lands cannot be sustained under that theorY , 
sec Reps & Smith, Control of Urban Land Subdivisions, 1 4  SYRACUSE L. REV. 405 
(1963). He.y��n and G_ilhool take a more expansive view of the matter, claiming, first, that subd1vm�n exa<;t10ns can be sustained alterna_
tivcly on special assessment, police 
power, or taxmg rauonales, and, sec<;>nd'. that special assessment theory is su fficiently 
broad to countenance the forced <led1cat10n of school and park lands. See Su bdivision 
Exactions, supra note 1 10. 
1 39. See, e.g., 14 M<;_QUILLIN, Mur-;1c1rAL CORPORATIONS, Special Taxation and Local 
Assessments § 38.02 (1910 rev. vol.) ; I W. PAGE & P .  JONES, TAXATI0:-1 BY LoC,\L AND 
SPECIAL ASSESSMENT § 1 1 ,  at 1 6-22, § 1 1 8, at  197-203 (1909). 
140. See, e.g., W. WINTER, THE SPECIAL ASSESSMEi\T TODA\' 18 ( 1 952); Spengler , 
The Increment Tax versus Special Assessments, 20 BULL . N AT'L TAX Ass'N 958 259 
( 1 935) . But see Subdivision Exactions, supra note l lO, at 1 1 48 -49. 
� ' 
1 4 1 .  See Reps & Smi th , supra no te 138, at 4 1 0 ;  14 McQUILLIN, MUi\ICil'AL CoR­
PORAl:U��s, Specia� Taxation and Local Assessments §§ 38. 1 1 -.29 (1970 rev. vol.). But see 
Subd1v1S1on Exactions, supra note l lO, at l l49. 
142. See 14 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, Special Taxation and Local As· 
sessments § 38.31 (1970 rev. vol.); 1 W. PAGE & P. JONES, supra note 139, § 1 1 , at 1 6-22. 
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The forced dedication of land within a subdivision or the payment 
of fees for school or recreational facilities elsewhere w ithin the com­
munity does not easily meet these stringent requirements. Although 
lands dedicated within the subdivision meet the spatial proximity test, 
lands acquired elsewhere in the community may not. 143 Also dubious 
on the basis of  traditional special assessment doctrine is the inclusion 
of educational and recreational facili ties within the class of improve­
ments that may be financed through assessments.144 Demonstrating 
that land within the subdivision increases in value in correlation with 
the value of the dedicated parcel or the amount of the substitute 
fee raises difficult questions of cost accounting that are not easily 
resolved.14;; A further complication, moreover, is the deep-seated 
American sentiment, implicit throughout the earlier subdivision ex­
action cases, 1 46 that recreational and educational expenses ought to 
be borne by the community as a whole, not by developers or new­
comers to the community. 
These cases warn that development rights transfer will encounter 
hostility if courts analogize the technique to special assessment. The 
resource whose protection is financed under the transfer program 
will typically be distant from the burdened parcels; its benefits, more­
over, will radiate throughout the jurisdiction instead of being lo­
calized to these parcels. Amenities and environmental resources do 
not fall within the traditional listing of improvements that may be fi­
nanced under special assessments. Finally, the price of development 
rights will not be tied to an increase in value accruing to transfer 
districts by virtue of resource protection. Rather, it will be made by 
the market on the basis of value increases attributable to the extra 
density. 
Courts, however, are not likely to analogize development rights 
transfer to special assessment. To begin with, the rationales sup­
porting the techniques differ. Unlike special assessment, develop­
ment rights transfer posits, first, that the externalities of land de­
velopment warrant shifting to it the cost of resource protection, and, 
second, that increases in private land values attributable to gov­
ernmental initiatives and general community growth can be recouped. 
The former premise is irrelevant to special assessment doctrine, which 
143. See note 136 supra. 
144. See note 1 41 supra. 
145. A proposed model for cost-accounting analysis is discussed in Subdivisio11 Exac­
tions, supra note l lO, at 1 14 1 ·46. 
146. See note 136 supra. 
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does not key the imposition to the assessed parcel's prospective uses.147 
The latter imports a more comprehensive concept of "benefit" than 
special assessment. 148 Furthermore, recent decisions have relied more 
heavily upon the roomier standards of the police power to evaluate 
the propriety of subdivision exactions. 1 49 J udicial recourse to these 
standards to scrutinize development rights transfer can be antici­
pated because the transfer technique is considerably more congruent 
with the exaction device than with special assessment. 
b. Development Rights Transfer and the Police Power 
In shifting to the police power recent subdivision exaction dcci­
sions100 place greater emphasis on the community-wide benefits re­
sulting from the exactions than on those accruing to the particular 
subdivision. This shift reflects the courts' appreciation of the prac­
tical difficulties that large-scale development poses for local govern­
ments151 and their willingness to favor the · latter in the trade-off 
between developer profits and sound commutiity growth.1;;:.? Thus, 
the improvement need not be located "Yithin or contiguous to the 
subdivision as long as i ts benefits are available to subdivision resi­
dents.153 It may benefit the remainder of the community, as - well as 
147. For this reason Page and Jones insist that special assessment is not a police 
power technique. "Under special assessment the benefits received by the assessed property 
must equal or exq:ed the amount of the assessment, while under the police power 
no a ttention is paid to the fact tha t ·  [the performance of a du ty] will confer any 
exceptive . [Jic] benefJ.t on [the] property, as i n  cases of .local assessments. 011 
the contrary, this power justifies the exaction from [the property owner] of 
that which will lessen the value of his estate by depriving h i m  of what wo ttld, 
under other circumstances, be a lawful use and enjoy ment of his property . . . .  
1 W. PAGE & P. JONES, TAXATION BY LOCAL AND SPECIAL ASSESSMENT § 92, a t  150 ( 1 909) 
(emphasis added). See also E. FREUND, supra note 4, at 635. Its foundation upon the 
principle of special benefits also precludes special assessment from classification as a 
conventional tax. See p. 125 infra. 
148. See p. 1 10 supra. It is this larger concept of benefit that u nderlies the 
proposal advanced by land economists and public finance specialists for a land value 
increment tax. See, e.g., Eliot, supra note 95, at 85; Spengler, supra note 95, at 56. 
149. See note 137 supra. 
15Q u. 
. 
1 5 1 .  See, e.g., Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of 
Walnut Creek, 4 Cal., 3d �33, 638, 484 P.2d 60.6, 6 1 0 - 1 1 ,  94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 634-35 ( 1 971);  Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Plannmg Comm'n, 1 60 Conn. 109, 1 1 3 - 1 5, 
273 A.2d 880, 883-84 (1970); Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 8'1-85, 2 1 8  
N.E.2d 673, 676, 2 7 1  N.Y.S.2d 955, 958-59 ( 1 966). 
1 5� . . In one subdivisi?n .. �xaction .cas� t.he court c�aracterize� the un?crlying conflict �s pit.Un� the de�eloper .s 1_11t.erest m flllmg the entire area with housing" against the pubhc mterest m . mamtammg a more healthful open space environment." Aunt 
Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Comm'n, 1 60 Conn. 1 0 9  1 1 9 273 A.2d 880 
885-86 (1970). 
' • . ' 
153.  See, e.g., Associated Home Bu ilders of the Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of 
Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. . �� 633, 4�4 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971) (sustaining fee to be used for acqms1t1on or improvement of parkland within three-quarter mile 
radius of subdivision) ; Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N .Y.2d 78, 2 1 8  N.E.2d 
673, 2 7 1  N.Y.S.2d 955 (1 966) (sustaining fee to be used for "park, playground and 
recreational purposes" anywhere within village). 
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these residents, provided that the subdivision is a contributing factor to 
the need for the facility.154 The improvement may be other than those 
traditionally financed by special assessment though it apparently must 
tie into the community's physical planning program. 155 Finally, no 
requirement is expressed in these opinions that the cost of the sub­
division jmprovement must correlate with the enhanced value ac­
cruing to subdivision land as a consequence of the improvement.156 
Associated Home Builders v. C ity of Walnut Creek/57 a 1 972 
California Supreme Court decision, exemplifies this liberalizing trend. 
A group of developers challenged a California statute and imple­
menting ordinance requiring either dedication of recreational lands 
or payment of a fee to be used for acquiring recreational facilities 
within a three-quarter mile radius of the subdivision. Predictably, 
the plaintiffs took refuge in special  assessment doctrine.  Their prin­
cipal claim was that the developer or fu ture residents of the sub­
division could be compelled under the legislation "to pay for rec­
reational facilities the need for which stems not from the develop­
ment of any one subdivision but from the needs of the community 
as a whole."158 They insisted that the exaction must "necessarily and 
primarily benefit the particular subdivision"109 and questioned wheth­
er recreational facilities may be secured through such exactions.160 
The court rejected these claims by testing the legislation against 
the less confining standards of t h e  police power, 161 noting the un-
154. See, e.g., Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of 
Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 637·41, 484 P.2d 606, 610-12, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 634-36 
(1971); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 6 1 7 - 1 8, 1 37 N.W.2d 442, 
447-48 (1965). Cases approving the propriety of fees in lieu of dedication deviate some· 
what from this requirement because the fees may typically be used to acquire land 
some distance from the subdivision. See cases c ited note 153 supra. In these cases, how­
ever, the pertinent legislation allows the mu nicipality to have recourse to fees only 
if dedication of lands within the subdivision is inappropriate given the subdivision's 
small size or the presence of an existing school or park within or nearby the sub­
division. Hence, they too require nearby school or parkland accessible to and serving 
the needs of the residents of that subdivision. 
155. Local governments have utilized the exaction technique principally to acquire 
school and recreational lands in addition to obtaining more traditional improvements 
such as sewers, streets, and drainage facilities. Existing practice suggests that the tech­
nique will likely be limited to achievement of the community's physical planning 
objectives. That this limitation may be judicially required is suggested in a recent 
influential case which distinguished between the legitimate employment of the tech­
nique for a community's recreational land needs and its use to serve the "more gen­
eral and diffuse need [that new residents create] for such areawide services as fire 
and police protection." Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City 
of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 642, 484 P .2d 606, 613, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 637 (1971) 
(dictum). 
156. See note 137 supra. 
157. 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971). 
158. Id. at 637, 484 P.2d at 610, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 634. 
159. Id. at 640, 484 P.2d at 6l l -12 , 94 Cal. Rptr. at 635-36. 
160. Id. at 64 1 ,  484 P.2d at 613, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 637 . 
. 161.  Id. at 644, 484 P.2d at 615,  94 Cal. Rptr. at 639. Also pertinent in the court's view was the addi tion to the California Constitution in 1966 of Article XXVIII, § l ,  
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fortunate consequences that shrinking open space and nsmg popula­
tion have wreaked upon development patterns in California and the 
nation.162 In the court's view communities may properly consider 
general community needs for recreational land as well as those of a 
particular subdivision in the formulation of subdivision programs. 1 0:1 
The court refrained from passing on the contention that the land must 
primarily serve the recreational needs of the subdivision because the 
challenged legislation expressly addressed this requirement,164 but i t  did 
mark in dictum its sympathy for the position advanced by the Sierra 
Club, as amicus curiae, that exactions can be justified under the 
police power even if employed for recreational facilities used by the 
general public rather than devoted to the special needs of future 
subdivision residents . 1 6 5  
The court did not agree that sustaining the legislation would be 
tantamount to approving the use of exactions for the indiscriminate 
financing of governmental operations. Instead, it distinguished the 
benefits that. subdivision residents would enjoy under the challenged 
legislation as "less diffuse" than those associated with general gov­
ernmental services such as fire and police protection. 1 66 In addition, 
the court hinted strongly at the negative externalities theme and 
the fundamental indivisibility of the land development process. The 
plaintiffs' argument, the court reasoned, 
overlooks the unique problem involved in utilization of raw 
land. Undeveloped land in a community is a limi ted resource 
which is difficult to conserve in a period of increased population 
pressure. The development of a new subdivision in and of itself 
has the counter-productive effect of consuming a substantial 
supply of this precious commodity, while at the same time in­
creasing the need for park and recreational land. In  terms of 
economics, subdivisions diminish supply and increase demand. 167 
which declares that open space and scenic beauty advance the "economic and social 
well-being of the state and its citizens." CAL. CONST. art. XXVII I ,  § I .  The court 
recognized that the challenged subdivision exaction legislation furthered these ··salutary 
purposes" and hence should be sustained if  at all possible. Associated Home Builders 
of the Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3<l 633, 638-39, 484 
P.2d 606, 61 1 ,  94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 635 (197 1).  But  the court's assessment of the legis­
lation's validity turned on the police power analysis recoun ted in text, not upon the 
cited constitutional provision. 
162. Id. at 639, 484 P.2d at 6l l ,  94 Cal. Rptr. at 635. 
1 63. Id. at 637-41 ,  484 P.2d at 610- 1 1 ,  94 Cal. Rptr. at 634-35. 
164. Id. at 640, 484 P .2d at 612, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 636. 
1 65. Id. at 648 n.6, 484 P .2d at 612 n.6, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 636 n.6. 
166. Id. at 641-42, 484 P.2d at 613, 94 Cal. Rptr. a t  637. See note 1 55 supra. 
167. Id. at 641-42, 484 P.2d at 613, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 637. 
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While Associated and its brethren are harbingers of j udicial ap­
proval of development rights transfer, they fall short of being con­
clusive because differences in the scope and struc ture168 of transfer 
and exaction 'programs have made it unnecessary for the courts to 
clearly enunciate an adequate legal  rationale for the transfer tech­
nique. Exactions, for example, have been employed for only a limited 
number of objectives, including the acquisition of land. for educa­
tional and recreational purposes, whereas development rights trans­
fer programs may embrace a variety of concerns. Despite their great­
er reliance u pon the police power, the recent opinions remain 
profoundly influenced by special assessment theory. The fact of more 
pronounced benefits for the subdivision than for the overall com­
munity remains the touchstone of even the most liberal decisions. In 
contrast, benefits afforded by transfer programs are community-wide 
in nature, rather than localized to the transfer district. 
The case for development rights transfer ultimately rests on two 
propositions which, though independently based, are mutually re­
inforcing: First, government may properly shift to developers and 
landowners the cost of resource protection programs initiated to coun­
teract the environmentally harmful effects of their land use deci­
sions; and, second, government may finance these programs by re­
capturing the i ncrement of the increase in land values attributable 
to governmental actions and general community growth . 
168. The postures of the subdivider and the landowner within a transfer district 
vis·il·vis the subdivision exaction and the pu rchase of development rig h ts, respectively, 
are not parallel . The subdivider must submit to the exaction, but the landowner may 
decline to con tri bu te to the resource protection effort by choosing not to purchase 
development rights. Cast in option form, development rights transfer is more akin to 
cluster zoning, see note 61 supra, and zoning bonuses, see note 33 suj;ra, than to sub­
division exaction. Because of the nonmandatory character of the former two techniques, 
commentators have argued that they arc considerably less vulnerable as uncom­
pensated takings, assuming that the densities permitted as of right under the p�·ograms 
employing them a re not so restrictive as to be confiscatory. See Hanna, SubdJvisio11s: 
Conditions lmfJosed by Local Govern 111e11t, 6 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 1 7� 1 83-84 (1966); 
Mandelker, The Basic PhilosojJhy of Zoning: Ince11tive or Restrai11 t?, in NEw ZONING, 
supra note 27, at 1 6. Because these tech niques env isage a trade of increased density 
for the prescribed amenity , the developer receives what one commentator has labeled 
a "de facto quid pro quo." Mandelker, supra. Despite its plausibility, this reasoning 
is subject in many states to the criticisms that com pensation must be paid in money, 
not special benefits; that where special benefits arc an appropriate med i um of tender, 
the value of development rights may be deemed too speculative to permit an award 
of development rights to so qualify; and that the condemnee is enti tled to a con­
demnation jury i n  an y event. &e Chicago Plan, supra note 52, at 598 n.75. Further, it 
can be persuasively argued that developmen t  rights transfer docs entail a mandatory 
exaction insofar as residual density levels within transfer districts are deliberately skewed 
below those ju stified by market and substan tive planning criteria. The contention 
would be that gove rnment is simply offering to sell back to the victim what it had 
previously purloin ed from him. Cf. Landa u ,  supra note 134, at 81 -82. I n  view of these 
uncertainties, the d iscussion assumes that the burdens suffered by landowners within 
transfer districts <lo not differ in principle from those incurred by developers under 
the subdivision exaction technique. 
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Both propositions are implicit, though u nrealized, in the recent 
subdivision exaction opinions. Reliance on the first proposition is 
apparent in the Associated court's sympathy for the Sierra Club's 
assertion that subdivision exactions are valid even if their benefits 
are enjoyed on a community-wide basis rather than localized prin­
cipally within the subdivision.169 
The second proposition is also reflected in Associated, but the 
court's appreciation of the recoupment j ustification for subdivision 
exactions is tepid at best. According to the court, 
The rationale of the [subdivision exaction] cases affirming con­
stitutionality indicate that the dedication statutes are valid under 
the state's police power. They reason that the subdivider realizes 
a profit from governmental approval of a subdivision since his 
land is rendered more valuable by the fact of subdivision, and 
in return for this benefit the city may require him to dedicate 
a portion of his land for park purposes whenever the influx of 
new residents will increase the need for park and recreational 
facilities.170 
By concentrating solely on the "fact of subdivision" as the cause of 
the increase i n  the value of private land, Associated and the prece­
dents i t  cites ignore capital improvement programs, public regula­
tion of other lands within the jurisdiction, governmental measures 
stimulating general community growth, and myriads of other initia­
tives that create i n  large part the economic framework for private 
transactions in land.171 The court's reasoning, moreover, gratuitously 
suggests the older "privilege" rationale for subdivision exactions, a 
rationale which even supporters of broad subdivision powers for 
local governments find distasteful.172 A firmer grasp of the theoretical 
underpinnings of the recoupment justiJication would have enabled 
the court to avert both difficulties. 
Prescribing a narrower ambit for exactions than for transfers may 
perhaps be warranted. Subdivision exaction programs are often piece­
meal in conception and reflect an undeniable tendency to treat the 
latest developer as a target for financing facilities whose benefits 
169. See p. 1 14 supra. 
170. Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of Walnut 
Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 644, 484 P.2d 606, 615, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 639 (1971).  
17  l .  See pp. 98-99 8c note 95 supra. 
172. See, e.g., Johns_lOf!, s.
upra n?t� 20, �� .881 ;  Subdivision Exactions, supra note l �O: .at 1 1 30 . . The .clas�1c jt�d1c1al opm10n uul_mng the privilege theory to sustain sub­d1v1S1on exactions is Ridgefield Land Co. v. C1ty of Detroit, 241 Mich. 468 2 1 7  N.W. 58 (1928). ' 
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are mainly of community-wide import.178 But the rationale for de­
velopment rights transfer is not so confined. Schemes such as the 
Chicago Plan and the Puerto Rico proposal look to the overall land 
developmen t process as the generator of funds for resource protec­
tion and address more comprehensively the impact of individual de­
velopment decisions upon the jurisdiction's total environmental fabric. 
By establishing an explicit framework for equ itably a llocating re­
source protection costs, transfer programs should a l lay j ustifiable 
constitutional and policy concerns that attend any cost-shifting de­
vice. The cause of judicial apprehensiveness with subdivision ex­
action programs, i n  fact, is the absence of clear standards that the 
courts can confidently invoke to prevent communities from over­
reaching the individual developer. Development rights transfer should 
meet this concern by calling for a n  inventory of the probable cost 
of the jurisdiction's resource protection needs and providing for their 
satisfaction through impositions tied to the value o f  development 
that can reasonably be anticipated in transfer districts. As express 
components of the transfer program, findings under both headings 
may be challenged by affected landowners in litigation. 
3. Development Rights Transfer and Equal Protection 
The Associated case also raised two equal protection issues that 
draftsmen o f  development rights transfer programs must anticipate. 
The plaintiffs argued that the challenged legislation violated equal 
protection by compelling contribu tions only from developers subject 
to the subdivision ordinance while leaving unaffected those not simi­
larly constrained174 and that the l egislation would operate in an ex­
clusionary manner by raising the cost of housing for newcomers to 
the community. 175 By analogy, developers and landowners within trans­
fer districts may claim, first, that they are denied equal protection 
because densities permitted as of right outside of the district will be 
more liberal than those within the district, and, second, that the 
price builders pay for the development rights which would otherwise 
be available by right will ultimately be passed on to the purchasers 
173. Rejecting the special assessment analogy as too restrictive a foundation for 
subdivision exac tions, Professor Johnston has properly observed: 
The entire municipality is a healthier, safer environment when subdivisions are 
provided with adequate streets, water, sani tation, and open space. I t  is this benefit 
to the total com mu nity which sustains the exercise of the police power, rather 
than the more direct benefit to the subdivision i tself. 
Johnston, supra note 20, at 87 1 n.2 1 (emphasis added). See also id. at 901 -03, 923. 
174. 4 Cal. 3d 633, 643-44, 484 P.2<l 606, 6 1 4 ,  94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 638 ( 1 971).  
175.  Id. at 648, 484 P.2d at 618,  94 Cal.  Rptr. a t  642. 
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o f  their projects. The merits o f  these claims depend entirely upon 
the details of the challenged transfer program, but A ssociated and 
related precedents are persuasive that properly impl emented tra nsfer 
programs will not fall on either count. 
The Associated court rejected the first contention by impl icitly re­
lying on the principle that a legislative classification comports wi th  
equal protection requirements i f  i t  i s  based u pon a ra tional cl is­
tinction.176 The same principle should immu nize development righ ts 
transfer from effective assault  if  the jurisdiction can point to docu­
mented economic and planning studies demonstrating t hat the areas 
selected as transfer districts can reasonably be expected to be focal 
points of future development. 
Nor did the court find the exclusionary argu ment com pell i ng . I n  
common with othe_r courts 177 and commentators,178 it  ex pressed gen­
uine concern about the trade-off between resource protection ancl 
achievement of other community objectives such as the prodµttio1} Q[  
low q>st housing. 179 It properly recognized, moreover, that st;JJd iv· isiQn 
exaction programs can be manipulated to achieYc excl usionary res.u I ts 
and that even when not so abused may tend to rai;;e. · the cost of t h e  
developer's finished product . 1 80 The court pragmatically responded 
to this dilemma by evaluating the program in l ight of the graY ity of  
the community's land u s e  problems a n d  t h e  extent to w h ic h  the 
program in fact produced exclus ionary consequences. 
A similar inquiry can be anticipated if a transfer progra m is im­
pugned as exclusionary. And a similar outcome can be predicted for 
thoughtfully formulated programs. If the progra m is institu ted be­
fore developers acquire land within transfer districts, it is far from 
certain that the cost of development rights will be passed on to hous­
ing consumers. From the developer's perspective i t  is immaterial 
whether he pays the seller, or the seller and the government, as long 
as the total price for the land remains unchang·ed. Using a tech­
nique known by real estate appraisers as "residual land value anal­
ysis,"181 the developer will i n  all likelihood discount the price that 
1 76. Id. at 643, 484 P.2d at 614,  94 Cal. Rptr. at 638. See Dandridge v. Wil liams, 
397 U.S. 471 ( 1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (196 1 ) .  
1 7 7 .  See Steel Hill Development, Inc. v .  Town o f  Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956, 961 
(lst Cir.  1972); cf. Golden v. Planning Board, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 378, 285 N .E.2d 29 1 ,  
302, 334 N .Y.S.2d 1 38,  152 (1972). 
1 78.  See, e.g., Harvith, Subdivision Dedication Requireinenls-Some Observatiu11s 
and an A lternative: A Special Tax on Gains from Uealty 33 ALBANY L. REv. 47-t 
477-80 (1969); Subdivision Exactions, supra note 1 10. ' ' 
179. Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Ilay, Inc. "· City of Walnut 
Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 648, 484 P.2d 606, 618, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 642 ( 1971) .  
1 80. Id. 
�8 1 .  Se� SrA�E ADRIFT,, s"!-pra note 33, at ch. 3 for an explanation and application of this technique m determmmg the value of development rights within Chicago's Loop. 
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he pays to the seller by the amou n t  he must pay to the government 
to secure the additional rights. Thus, the costs of the transfer pro­
gram will be borne principally by landowners and speculators, not 
by consumers. 1 82 
Even if resource protection costs are shifted to consumers, it hardly 
follows that courts will find transfer programs exclusionary. De­
velopment i n  many transfer districts will be primari l y  industrial or 
commercial i n  nature, 183 thus obviating the objection altogether. In­
dependently of transfer programs, moreover, the cost of housing in 
districts likely to become residen tial will often fall within the middle 
income and luxury range, a circumstance that is not constitutionally 
troublesome i f  the jurisdiction has made adequate provision for low 
cost housing elsewhere within its boundaries.184 Nor can it be con­
cluded without refined economic projections that development rights 
transfer will unduly raise costs i n  transfer districts where low cost 
housing is a nticipated. 
Two final points bear emphasis in assessing the cost implications 
of developme n t  rights transfer, whe ther in conjunction with exclu­
sionary zoning or other social concerns. First, a transfer program will 
be only one component of the jurisdiction's land use plan . As such, 
it should be accommodated with o th er goals. If, for exa m ple, a juris­
diction is committed to increasing i ts supply of low i ncome housing, 
it could exclude from considera tion as transfer districts areas con­
taining probable sites for this housing. 
Second, pain ful social and economic trade-offs are inevitable in 
the nation 's quest for environmental quali ty. It is fanciful to assume 
that resource protection will come without a price tag either now 
or in the future. Such assumptions, i n  fact, have plunged the nation 
into the environmental quagmire from which it is belatedly straining 
to extricate i tself. 
1 82. For a detailed analysis of the relationship between zoning and the price that 
informed developers will pay for land, see id. at ch. 4. Significantly, House a11d Home, 
the trade organ of the home building indus try, has enthusiastically en dorsed land in­
crement value taxation on the ground that it would lower the price that developers 
pay for land, thereby lowering the price of housing for the ultimate consumer. See 1 8  
HOUSE AND HOME, Aug. 1960, passim. 
183. Under t h e  Chicago Plan, for example, it is contemplated that transfer dis­
tricts will often coincide with the city's central commercial and office districts. See 
Chicago Plan, supra note 52, at 594-96; SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 33,  at 49-50. 
184. See, e.g., SASSO v. City of Union City ,  424 F.2d 291, 294-95 (9th Cir. 1970); 
Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 1 17 N.J. Super. 1 1 ,  1 5 · 1 6, 283 
A.2d 353, 355-56 (Super. Ct. 1 972); cf. In re Appeal of Girsch, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A .2d 
395 _ (1970). See generally Bigham & Bostick. Exclusionai·y Zoninfi Practices: A n  Exami­nation of the Curre n t  Controversy, 25 VAND. L. REV. 1 1 1 1  ( 1 9 12); Cunningham, The 
Interrelationship Between Exclusionary Zoning and Exclusionary Subd ivisio_n Con trol­
A Second Look, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 290 (1 973); Comment, Modern Soczal Problems 
and Land Use Regulation-The New Jersey ExjJe rience, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 732 
(1973); Annot., 48 A.L.R. 3d 1 2 1 0  (1973). 
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4. Development Righ ts Transfer and Zoning Enab ling Legisla t ion 
Two additional issues may arise if local governments implement 
transfer programs u nder legislation akin to the Standard State Zoning 
Enabling Act.185 I t  may be argued that development rights transfer 
violates the Act's uniformity requiremen t186 because some lots w it h in 
a transfer district may be developed to greater maximum densit ies 
than others. The second issue is whether the purposes section1 87 0£ 
the Act comprehends the broader environmental and amenity goals 
that transfer progra ms envisage. Although the j udic ial gloss placed 
on the Act in the half-century since its formulation appears ample 
on both counts, amendment of the pertinent enabling legislation may 
nevertheless be advisable. 
a. The " Uniform ity" O bjection 
It is unclear in many jurisdictions whether the uniformity require­
ment even applies to bulk regulations. 188 If it does, however, cluster189 
and PUD 190 precedents, which have consistently sustained the dual 
bulk system against the charge of nonuniformity, should be adequate 
to obtain judicial approval of a transfer program. The uniformity 
requirement, those precedents reason, mandates only that landowners 
within the district be afforded reasonable access to the increased 
density offered by the density zoning measure. It is irrelevant whether 
the development end product is in fact identical in terms of com­
parative proj ect bulk, height, or area. 
So construed, the u niformity requirement would be satisfied by 
the development rights transfer proposal set forth in this article. The 
relevant inquiry would be whether all landowners within the transfer 
district enjoy equivalent access to the development rights that are 
offered for sale there and not whether some landowners i n  the dis­
trict will ultimately build to greater densities than others by virtue 
of the program. Care must be taken, therefore, to insure that pro­
visions relating to the public offer and sale of the rights provide the 
requisite access. 
185. ADVISORY COMMITIEE ON ZONING, DEP'T OF CO MMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONI1'G 
ENABLING ACT UNDER WHICH MUNICIPALITIES MAY ADOPT ZONING REGULATIONS (rev. e<l. 
1926). 
186. Id. § 2. 
187. Id. § 3. 
1 88. See cases cited in Chicago Plan, supra note 52, at 625 n.194. 
189. See Prince George's County v. M & B Construction Corp., 267 Md. 338, 297 
A.2d 683 (1 972); Chrinko v. South Brunswick Twp. Planning Bd., 77 N .J. Super. 594, 
187 A.2d 221 (L. Div. 1963). 
190. See Orinda Homeowners Comm. v. Board of Supervisors, I I  Cal. A pp . 3d 
768, 90 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970); Cheney v. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc. 429 Pa. 626 24 1 
A.2d 81 (1968). 
' ' 
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b. The· "Purposes" Objection 
For most courts today the purposes section of the Standard State 
Zoning Enabling Act is virtually coextensive with the scope of the 
police power.191 Particularly favored in recent decisions is the en­
hancement of environmental quality through zoning measures.192 
Hence, it would be surprising i ndeed if a transfer p rogram were 
struck down a s  ultra vires. Whatever uncertainty may exist on this 
point in a specific jurisdiction, however, can be erased a ltogether by 
proper modification of zoning enabling legislation. 
III. Development Rights Transfer: Areas for Further Inquiry 
The economic and planning ramifications of development rights 
transfer .are largely uncharted terrain, not only for the lawyer, but 
for the land economist and plann e r  as well. Given the complexity 
of potential problems, the gaps i n  existing research, and the evident 
dangers of i mplementing poorly conceived transfer programs, it is 
obvious that extensive investigation and controlled experimentation 
is necessary. The purpose of this section is to facilitate subsequent 
inquiry by cataloguing the salient problems and by suggesting a modi­
fied version of the transfer device-enacted as a taxing measure-that 
may alleviate the thornier of these problems. 
A. Economic Questions 
One set of questions is that which arises in determi ning the losses 
that the owner or owners of the resource site incur under the trans­
fer program .  A second is concerned with skewing the cost of devel­
opment rights (or, correlatively, the residual densities within transfer 
districts) at levels that generate the revenues needed for resource pro­
tection without discouraging new construction in transfer districts. 
191.  For a summary of the variety of p u rposes that may legitimately be pursued 
through zoning regulation, see URBAN PLANNING, supra note 122, at §§ 4 1 -52. The rare 
case· in which a zoning measure serving a concededly valid police power objective is 
invalidated as not in pursuance of a proper zoning purpose can typically be ex­
plained on other grounds. In Westwood Forest Estates, Inc. v. Village of South Nyack, 
!!3 N.Y.2d 424, 244 N.E.2d 700, 297 N .Y.S.2d 1 29 (1 969), for example, the court in­
rnlidated a zoning measure barring further apartment construction which was passed 
by the municipality to prevent pollution of the Hudson River by i nadequately treated 
mu nicipal sewage. One ground of the decision was that pollution control is not a 
proper zoning p u rpose. Alternatively, the court ruled that the ordinance was not en­
acted in accordance with a comprehensive plan and hinted at its possible invalidity 
on equal protection grounds as imposing upon the plaintiff a burden that should 
have been borne by the community generally. Two years later, however, the former 
proposition was overruled sub silentio by Salamar Builders Corp. v. Tuttle, 29 N.Y.2d 
221, 275 N.E.2d 585, 325 N.Y.S.2d 933 ( 1971 ), which sustained a zoning ordinance 
increasing mini mum lot sizes expressly to alleviate the pollu tion of local wells and 
of the drainage reservoir serving the entire area. 
192. See note IO supra. 
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I .  · The Protected Resource 
The losses suffered at the resource site pose two issues: their 
amount and the extent to which they are compensable under the 
standards of the applicable transfer program. Resolving the first 
issue requires a determination of the difference between the val ue 
of the resource site before and after the restrictions are imposed.m 
Although this task may be somewhat complicated by the character of 
the threatened resource,194 it is one that appraisers routinely under­
take when government acquires a less than fee interest in private 
property. 
Establishing how much, if any, of this loss is legally compensable 
is less easily resolved. Despite endless litigation on this issue since 
Euclid, the development of standards that are both rational and pre­
dictable seems no closer to realization today.19'> Accounting for the 
issue's apparent intractability are the lack of an explicit, generally ac­
cepted policy framework defining with reasonable precision the legiti­
mate . economic expectations of those engaged in land development 
and the assumption that the courts can adequately fashion such a 
policy, unaided by legislative and administrative bodies. 
Under transfer progrnms, however, a n  administrative agency rather 
than a court would address the compensation issue initially.196 The 
agency's more sophisticated grasp of the complexities of land eco­
nomics, sharpened by its day-to-day experience in administering the 
transfer program, should prepare it to evaluate the impact of the 
program's restrictions on specific resource sites. Compensable damages 
will be measured pursuant to statutory standards framed either as a 
simple legislative incorporation of the constitutional ban against un­
compensated takings197 or as a more detailed formula  that might, 
for example, mandate a minimum rate of return for restricted sites. 1 9 8  
193. For a description and application o f  these techniques to determine the eco­
nomic damages suffered by owners of urban landmark properties , sec SPACE ADRIFT, 
supra note 33, at ch. 3. Other illustrations may be found in the cases an<l au­
thorities cited in Chicago Plan, supra note 52, at 6 1 7  n.169. 
194. Appraising the damages suffered as .. a result of the imposition of permanent 
landmark status o� a downtown office building, for example, is considerably more 
complex than makmg a si\nilar determination regarding restrictions on unimprorcrl 
land. See SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 33, at 176. 
195. See authorities cited note 106 supra. 
196. See p. 93 supra. 
197. ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 4-402(5) (Tent. Draft No. 5, I9i3) 
illustrates this approach by directing a court in a condemnation action growi ng out of 
restrictions upon a "development permission'" to include among the 
"assumptions [that] 
shall produce the highest market value" a condemnation award keyed to " the mi11imun1 
development necessary to eliminate the unconstitutional taking." 
1 98. An example of this approach is found in the New York City landma rks 
ordinance, which defines reasonable return as a net annual return of six percent on 
the landmark property's assessed valuation. See NEW YoRK, N.Y. AnMIN. CODE ch. g.,\, 
§ 207-1 .0q (1971). 
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If the former standard is used the agency will employ the same 
general premises in fixing compensation for the sites of threatened 
resources that i t  uses in selecting residual densities within transfer 
districts. That is, the value of the most profitable use of those 
sites will be discounted to reflect the extent to which i t  is  a product 
of community rather than private efforts and the degree to which 
the harm posed by the sites' conversion to higher density use may 
properly be proscribed under the police power. The latter standard 
will entail greater involvement o f  the legislative branch, probably 
the key to ac_hieving a consensus concerning the legitimate economic 
gain to be permitted from private land use and hence likely to be 
given greater deference by the courts. 
If the agency or a reviewing court determines that compensation 
is due for a restriction, the j urisdi ction may pay the award and ac­
quire a protective interest in the site or i t  may decline to do so and 
instead rezone the site to the most restrictive dens i ty compatible 
with the applicable standards.199 I ts choice will depend in part, of 
course, upon the availability of funds generated by the transfer 
program and by other conventional revenue sources. Presumably it 
will opt for the second course i f  these funds are insufficient to pay 
the award o r  if, i n  its judgment, they ought instead be allocated to 
protect other resources of greater relative merit. 
2. The Transfer District 
In order to determine whether the demand for new construc­
tion in an a rea proposed as a transfer district will be sufficient to 
create an adequate market for development rights, market studies 
addressing, for example, past and projected land absorption rates, 
existing or proposed public improvements within the area, and demo­
graphic patterns should be made.200 Once a given area is established 
as a likely target for intensive fu ture development, a transfer pro­
gram must be designed to permit developers to build profitably un­
der its controls. Overly harsh residual densities or development con­
trols that offer l ittle financial advantage to the developer may spell 
trouble in one of two forms. Developers may cannibalize the program 
by bringing political pressure to dilute its stringent dens ity regime 
or they may be frightened away from the transfer district al together, 
choosing instead to build in ou tlying areas. I n  neither case would 
the community obtain the funds to finance its resource protection 
199. See p. 94 supra. 
200. See SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 33, at ch. 4. 
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effort in the latter it would unwittingly encourage metropolitan 
sprawl. If these outcomes are to be avoided, the details of
. 
t_he trans­
fer prognm must be closely meshed with market cond1t10ns and 
requirements. 
B. Planning Questions 
The major planning tasks associated with transfer programs are 
identifying sites containing sensitive resources and devising 1·egub­
tions to safeguard them, insuring that density trnnsfers do not create 
design abuse, and coordinating transfers with other features of the 
jurisdiction's comprehensive plan. The first task 'vill require the 
hiring of qualified specialists knowledgeable about the characteristics 
of the resources located in the transfer program area. 
Preventing design abuse within transfer districts, while not with­
out its technical challenges, should by no means be insuperable. A 
dual bulk system does present design complications that are not en­
countered under traditional bulk zoning.201 Thus, suitable areas must 
be selected as transfer districts; zoning trade-offs (including increased 
floor area, tower coverage, or reduced lot size) which will be financially 
attractive to developers without causing congestion or other undue 
planning results must be identified. Generally successful results un­
der zoning bonus, cluster, and PUD programs-each of which allo­
cates density with as much flexibility as a transfer program-demon­
strate that the technical difficulties inherent in these functions should 
prove manageable.202 Development rights transfer, in fact, may well 
be less difficult to administer than these other flexible zonmg 
initiatives.203 
201. For an enumeration of these risks in the context of urban landmark preser­
vation and of appropriate safeguards to offset them, see SrACE ADRIFT, supra note 33, 
at ch. 5. 
202. See generally NEW ZONING, supra note 27; W. WHYTE, supra note 61. 
203. In allowing additional density on the same site as the amenity that the com­
munity "purchases" with this dens ity, they create palpable risks of congestion on 
that �ite. To •. ayoid ,;ongestioi:i, planners must limit density to an amount t_hat the amenity _can digest: See Chicago Plan, supra note 52, at 594 n.69. Calculatmg this 
amount is a two-step operation: a ratio must be fixed between a stated inc1·emc11t of 
density and its co1'.sequences in ter�s of design compatibility with surrounding de­
velopment and of uicreased po�ulat1on and atl�ndant loads on publi c facilities and 
services; and, second, the capacity of the amcmty-be it a park, arcade, or subway 
concour�e-to oifset th_ese. consequences must be projected. That these calculations are less a job for the shde rule than for informed guesswork appears in Ada Louise 
Huxtable'_s comment th":t the "point at which inc1:eased density tips the scales againsc 
planned improvements is a matter for the Delphic Oracle." Thi11hi11g Ma11's Zoning, 
N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1971, § 2. at 22, col. 5. 
Neither the digesti_on .rationale nor its speculativ� calcul<;ttions pertains in a transfer context because density 1s transferred to a geographically distant transfer d istric t rather 
than added to the resource site. Total density for the latter is fixed just as it would 
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Coordinating a transfer program with the jurisdiction's compre­
hensive plan will undoubtedly provide the most severe test for de­
velopment rights transfer. Regrettably, the phrase "comprehensive 
plan" is often little more than a euphemism for a melange of land 
use policies-or nonpolicies-that happen to prevail in a jurisdiction 
at any given point in time. The neat formulations of planning the­
orists notwithstanding, this "plan" is typically more reflective of lob­
bying activities and other realities of the land development process 
than of conscious strategies adopted in pursuance of selected com­
munity goals to advance the public interest. Not only is a transfer 
program unlikely to work under such circumstances, but it could 
well compound existing distortions in the local planning picture. 
Public officials can react to these unpleasant observations by dis­
missing development rights transfer as intriguing but impractical, 
or, hopefully, by upgrading the quality of their planning efforts.204 
They could also choose to minimize these technical problems by sub­
stituting for density transfers an outright tax upon all or selected 
kinds of development.205 Since n o  density would be transferred un­
der this approach, the community's physical planning regime would 
be no more subject to distortion than it is under traditional bulk 
zoning. 
This approach is attractive on other grounds as well. Because the 
transfer program would be implemented as a taxing measure, neither 
a showing of benefits correlated with the levy nor of the injurious 
impact of land development on the general welfare would be neces­
sary. 206 The jurisdiction must demonstrate only that the levy is for 
be for a traditional bulk district except that it is not a unitary figure but a com­
posite of residual density plus the additional density that landowners there may 
purchase in the form of development rights. 
204. The call for improved planning is more than an academic remedy. Congress, 
the American Law Institute, state legislatures, and the foundations are moving dramati· 
cally to afford technical and financial support. The electorate too has become in· 
creasingly conscious of and distressed by the formerly hidden costs of inadequate public 
land use control, much of it traceable to inferior planning. America's "new mood," in 
short, could provide the impetus for a sophisticated, sustained planning commitment 
which, in remedying many of the nation's land use deficiencies, could alleviate as well 
the design risks that inhere in development rights transfer. 
205. See Harvith, supra note 178, passim; S!lbdivision Exactions, supra note 110, at 
I146-54; Doebelc, Improved State Enabling Legislation for the Nineteen-Sixties, 2 
NATURAL REs. J. 321, 341-42 (1962), for evaluations of the legality and merits of en­
acting subdivision legislation within a taxing rather than a police power rubric. A 
license tax upon the business of constructing dwellings keyed to the number of bed· 
rooms per dwelling was sustained in Associated Home Builders of the Greater East 
Bay, Inc. v. C ity of Newark, 18 Cal. App. 3d 107, 95 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1971), com­
mented upon in 23 ZONING DIGEST 231 (1971). 
206. Cf. Associated Home Builders of the Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of Newark, 
18 Cal. App. 3d 107, 95 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1971) (sustaining as an occupation tax a 
levy on developers keyed to the number of bedrooms included in their projects). 
See pp. ll2-l 7 supra. 
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a proper governmental purpose,207 a characterization that is self­
evident given the program's goal of resource protection. In the legis­
lative arena where the question of the tax's social equity would be 
addressed, the rationale for development rights transfer set forth in 
this article would be as cogent for the taxing alternative as for the 
police power alternative. 
A host of additional advantages would result if the tax were im­
posed broadly on all or most forms of new construction. The equal 
protection difficulties associated with the special burdens suffered 
by landowners within transfer districts208 would be reduced because 
there would not be a sharp distinction between lands within and 
lands outside of the district. Eliminating this distinction would also 
reduce the dangers of program dilution and of development that 
leapfrogs transfer districts.209 Further, enlarging the incidence of the 
imposition would dilute the exclusionary zoning objection210 because 
resource protection costs would be borne by a larger class of land­
owners and developers than under the police power alternative. It 
would likely generate greater revenue as well. 
Finally, in that all or most new construction would be required 
to contribute to the resource protection effort, a broad-based tax. 
would also be more consistent with the fact that the land develop­
ment process is essentially indivisible. So conceived, the taxing al­
ternative would generate a community "Environmental Trust Fund'' 
financed by "users" of the environment much as the national High­
way Trust Fund211 is supported by a variety of levies upon users of 
America's highways. 
Despite the tax proposal's obvious merits and the current appeal of 
environmental issues, popular resistance to further taxation of any 
kind could prove insurmountable. Further, the planning advantages 
other than resource protection that density transfers afford212 would 
largely be lost. Choice of the type of tax-property, income, or excise 
-and the proper taxing vehicle are pregnant with economic and 
administrative consequences which, although different, are potentially 
as troublesome as the design risks of the police power approach. Opt-
207. See 1 COOLEY, supra note llO, at § 174; 16 McQUILLIN, Mu;-.;1cIPAL CORPORA-
TIONS, Taxation § 44.35 (1972 rev. vol.). 
208. See pp. 117-18 supra. 
209. See p. 123 supra. 
210. See pp. 117-19 supra. 
211. For a concise des cription of the Highway Trust Fund, see J. Buol.\NAN, Tm 
PUBLIC FINANCES 553-70 (rev. ed. 1965). Another commentator has also noted the ap· 
peal of a trust fund approach. See Wexler, supra note 42, at 203-04. 
212. See p. 101 supra. 
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ing for a land increment value tax, for example, requires prescribing 
standards for distinguishing "earned" from "unearned increments," 
upgrading existing assessment procedures and personnel, and nurtur­
ing a political framework that insures evenhanded, consistent treat­
ment of property owners.21a 
The tax and the density transfer approaches proceed f rom the same 
policy foundation, call for similar background studies, would be ad­
ministered by cognate staffs using parallel procedures, and would 
have largely equivalent economic consequences for resource owners, 
developers, and landowners. From a research viewpoint, therefore, 
they need not be regarded as mutually exclusive because inquiry into 
their feasibility can be conducted on a joint basis. From the perspec­
tive of legislative strategy, the choice between the two will depend 
in large part upon whether planning risks or popular objection to 
the imposition of a new tax is perceived as more objectionable. 
Conclusion 
The central argument advanced in this article is that the develop­
ment potential of private property is in part a community asset al­
locable to serve the community's needs. As im plemented· under de­
velopment rights transfer this principle vastly expands government's 
economic and planning leverage over private land use decisions. 
Concomitantly, it places the leadership and administrative burden for 
resource protection more squarely on government's shoulders. 
Government must not permit the real estate community or over­
zealous environmentalists to make the transfer program a captive of 
their special interests, or, failing this, to dilute or scuttle it. It must 
frankly communicate to the public that, like any other resource pro­
tection initiative, development rights transfer comes freighted with 
a mix of costs and benefits, chief among the former being the zoning 
adjustments or development charges of the police power and taxing 
approaches. It should be alert ·to the larger social and economic 
trade-offs that density transfers cause, fashioning and managing its 
transfer program to achieve resource protection without running 
roug·hshod over other community goals. It must insulate the transfer 
prog!,am from planning and design amateurs by assembling an ade­
quately funded and qualified planning staff and b y  supporting the 
staff's initiatives against unwarranted political interference. Finally, 
213. See generally authorities cited note 95 supra. 
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government needs to be realistic about the inherent possibility of 
favoritism that development rights transfer shares with other public 
programs which distribute lucrative franchises and privileges on the 
basis of flexible criteria. 
Expanded governmental land use initiatives are imperative to hold 
the line on further environmental deterioration. The risks of devel­
opment rights transfer, therefore, must be assessed against those of 
available or proposed alternatives, not against some supposed trouble­
free ideal. Two such alternatives-the traditional harm/benefit test 
and the proposal that compensation for governmental interference with 
private land use be limited to the sole case of actual appropriation 
of private land-have been considered in tandem with development 
rights transfer with this purpose in mind. Measured against them and, 
more fundamentally, against the current land use ferment, develop­
ment rights transfer could well be an idea whose time has come. 
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